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Abstract
A website monetizes information it collects about its customers by charging third
parties for targeted access to them. Allowing for third parties who are well-intentioned,
a nuisance, or even malicious, the resulting consumer experiences might be good, bad,
or neutral. As consumers learn from experience, the website especially risks losing
those customers who su¤er a bad experience. Customer retention thus motivates
the website to be cautious about monetization, or to spend resources to screen third
parties. We study the websites equilibrium privacy policy, its welfare properties,
competition in the market for information, and the impact of regulations improving
transparency and consumer control.
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1 Introduction
The internet has transformed how consumers shop. Sophisticated online platforms enable
advertisers to target relevant ads to consumers, but, absent reliable safeguards, might also
be a vehicle for cybercrime or unwanted targeted advertising. Malicious advertising (or
malvertising) is particularly nefarious because it degrades the fundamental business model
for advertising-supported websites. Successful malvertising places deceptive ads that make
disingenuous o¤ers, install malicious code (e.g. ransomware), or phish for personal infor-
mation (e.g. passwords).1 Such risks discourage online commerce, or encourage protective
measures that reduce website revenue (e.g. ad blockers).
Consider the following incident highlighted in an early U.S. Senate report on privacy
hazards of online advertising:2
In September 2009, the New York Times sold advertising space on its website using
both third-party ad networks and direct sales. An advertiser claiming to represent the
Internet telephony company Vonage contacted the New York Times o¤ering to purchase
advertising space on NYTimes.com. Vonage had previously run advertisements through the
New York Times, so the newspaper allowed a third-party vendor it was unfamiliar with to
actually deliver the ad. For several weeks, the advertiser submitted wholly legitimate-looking
advertisements, which the New York Times ran without incident. Then, at the beginning of
a weekend, the advertiser replaced the Vonage advertisements with an ad proclaiming that
the users computer was not safe, and that the user should purchase fake antivirus software
to protect her computer. That fake antivirus software, once placed on a users computer,
could steal personal data and extort money from consumers hoping to make the virus go
away.
This relatively simple case of malvertising illustrates several issues. First, even main-
stream websites can expose consumers to signicant cyber risks. Consumers who visited
the Times website and clicked on the fake ad downloaded malicious code that potentially
exposed them to data theft and extortion. In the case of a drive-by download, however,
the consumer doesnt even have to click on the ad to become infected by malware.3 Second,
a website can better protect its consumers by exercising precaution in its dealing with third
parties. The Times acknowledged that it might have prevented the attack by vetting the
third-party who delivered the fake Vonage ad, and promised that in the future it would
1See RiskIQ (2016) and U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental A¤airs (2014).
2U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental A¤airs (2014).
3See, for example, Danny Palmer, This malvertising campaign infected PCs with ransomware with-
out users even clicking a link,AZNEt, June 21, 2017, https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-malvertising-
campaign-infected-pcs-with-ransomware-without-users-even-clicking-a-link/
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not allow its advertisers to use unfamiliar third-party vendors.4 While the Times incident
involved direct sales advertising for which proper vetting might be relatively easy, malver-
tising is especially di¢ cult to stop for targeted ads served by advertising networks, as these
typically involve numerous third parties over which the website has little or no oversight,
and target particular consumers whom the website may fail to identify before it is too late.5
Third, consumers may be unsure of their vulnerability to cyberattacks. The malware attack
on the Times only threatened computers running Windows.6 More generally, however, mal-
ware can exploit many di¤erent software vulnerabilities about which consumers may have
limited or no awareness. Finally, concerns about cyber risks might reduce website tra¢ c.
In its own reporting on the malvertising attack, the Times acknowledged that such events
can damage a websites reputation and make its visitors nervous.7
Motivated by such issues, we develop a theory of privacy protection for an environment
in which consumers learn from experience about their utility of visiting a website, which
depends both on the consumers value of website content and on the consumers vulnerability
to intrusions. Under these conditions a websites privacy policy a¤ects consumer retention
by altering consumer experience and thus consumer learning. In our model, a website o¤ers
a free service and earns revenue from banner advertising (or another activity that doesnt
compromise privacy). The website also collects information about its customers that it can
use to charge third parties for targeted access to them (or prot from some form of marketing
that raises privacy concerns). Such transactions with third parties could be benecial to
consumers, for example, by enabling targeted advertising that informs consumers of desirable
products, or intrusive, for example, by increasing exposure to spam, phishing, or malware.8
Those customers experiencing intrusions become more pessimistic about their overall utility
from a return visit to the website, and this learning mechanism gives the website an incentive
for a privacy policy that limits third-party transactions in order to protect at least partially
its customers from intrusion and thereby improve customer retention.
More precisely, we study a simple two-period model. In the rst period, a population of
consumers enjoy a free service provided by the website.9 The service is an experience good,
4David Gallagher , Times site was victim of a malicious ad swap,New York Times, September 14,
2009, https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/times-site-was-victim-of-a-malicious-ad-swap/
5Ashlee Vance, Times Web Ads Show Security Breach, New York Times, September 14, 2009,
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/technology/internet/15adco.html.
6Riva Richmond, What to do if you saw an antiviruspop-up ad,New York Times, September 14,
2007, https://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/what-to-do-if-you-saw-an-antivirus-pop-up-ad/.
7Op. cit., Gallagher.
8For simplicity, we assume banner ads pose no risk to consumers. What is important for our purposes
is that targeted ads poses a greater risk of a malicious intrusion. This is a natural assumption because, as
noted above, banners ads are much easier to vet.
9This baseline model can be interpreted as examining a particular cohort in an overlapping generation
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for which the consumers have heterogeneous values in the second period. The website also
sells a matching service to third parties that provides targeted access to consumers. The
websites privacy policy is a choice of precaution, determining the probability that the
website does not sell the matching service to an interested third party in the rst period.
Consumers do not directly observe the websites choice of precaution, and instead form
equilibrium beliefs. Matching with a third party results in a consumer experience that may
be good, bad, or neutral; a neutral experience is the same as if there is no third-party match.
Consumers are unsure of their vulnerability, dened as the probability of a bad experience.
In the rst period, consumers have identical prior beliefs about vulnerability, and, in the
second period, consumers use Bayes Rule to update their beliefs about vulnerability based
on their rst-period experiences. The consumers optimize whether to return to the website,
given their realized utility value of the website service and their posterior beliefs of vulner-
ability. An equilibrium is a prot-maximizing level of precaution and consumer posterior
beliefs (determining their willingness to make a return visit) that are mutually consistent.
Equilibrium is well behaved in our baseline model with a single website or, equivalently,
with single-homing consumers. Website precaution in the rst period is decreasing in the
rst-period value of third-party sales relative to the second-period value of retaining cus-
tomers. In a full-precaution regime, this relative value is su¢ ciently low that the website
does not o¤er to match third parties with its customers. Conversely, in a no-precaution
regime, the relative value is su¢ ciently high that the rm sells the matching service to all
interested third parties. There is also an intermediate partial-precaution region, in which
precaution is decreasing in the relative value. The website provides no precaution in the
second period, because there is no future relationship with returning consumers.10
We then extend our analysis to the case of multiple websites serving multi-homing con-
sumers, thus providing a novel model of competition in the market for information. We
nd that there always exists an equilibrium in which all websites exert no precaution but
there may also exist an equilibrium that is qualitatively similar to the one obtained in our
baseline model. We also show that competition reduces the price of the matching service
and that there is less precaution than in the baseline model if the market for information is
a major source of revenues for websites.
A websites equilibrium incentive for precaution is at best only imperfectly aligned with
consumer welfare. This is not surprising because consumers cannot verify website precau-
model that crudely distinguishes between youngand oldconsumers.
10Thus the two-period model captures starkly the intuitive idea that the website has a greater incentive
to protect patrons with a higher customer lifetime value (CLV), which is the prot attributed to the entire
future relationship.
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tion. Consumer short-term (i.e. rst period) welfare increases with precaution if their
expected utility from third-party matching (match utility) is negative, while long-term
(i.e. second period) consumer welfare also decreases with precaution due to less informa-
tive learning about vulnerability. We show in our baseline model that the website would
choose less precaution than the equilibrium level if it could commit to rst-period precau-
tion, assuming that no precaution in the second period remains prot-maximizing. The
website, however, may nd it optimal to commit to positive second-period precaution if
that su¢ ciently improves consumer retention.
Robust welfare-improving regulations are not readily apparent. We examine the e¤ects
of policies improving transparency and consumer control such as those included in the
European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Privacy
Act. We show that a transparency policy that requires ex post disclosure of matching service
sales leads to less precaution, which would benet consumers if their expected utility from
third-party matching is positive but would have mixed e¤ects otherwise. We also examine
a transparency policy that requires a website to commit ex ante to a minimum level of
precaution. Under conditions implying the website always sells targeted access to returning
customers, such policy is inconsequential in our baseline model with a single website because
the website wants to commit to less, rather than more, precaution. The same holds in the
setting with multiple websites provided the value of the rst period matching service is
su¢ ciently low. We then consider an opt-out rule allowing customers to refuse permission
for the website to use their personal information for third-party matching. In the most
interesting scenario, in which consumers opt out in the second period if and only if they
have a bad experience in the rst period, allowing rms to o¤er opt-out is always consumer
surplus improving in the setting with a single website, but may be detrimental to consumers
in an environment with multiple websites serving multi-homing consumers. When opt-out
is not o¤ered on a voluntary basis, a mandatory opt-out policy leads to more precaution.
An opt out-rule necessarily improves consumer welfare in the second period by revealed
preferences, but greater precaution in the rst period is benecial only if, given prior beliefs
about vulnerability, expected match utility is negative.
We study three extensions of our model. These extensions add positive insights about
website incentives for privacy protection, but do not reverse our normative conclusion about
the di¢ culty of designing robust welfare-improving regulations. First we allow for costly
verication that third-party uses of personal information are benign, enabling the website
to prevent bad consumer experiences. The websites strategy is then given by the level of
precaution and level of verication. We characterize the equilibriumwhen the website cannot
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commit to its strategy, and show in particular that the equilibrium level of verication is
non-monotonic in the value of third-party matching. We also show that verication and
precaution are substitutes for the website, so that the ability to verify third-parties would
reduce the level of precaution. The other two extensions relax some of the simplifying
assumptions made in our baseline model. One of them assumes that consumers not only
learn about the probability of a bad experience but also about the probability of a good
one, and the other one considers an elastic demand in the rst period.
Related literature. The economics of privacy literature echoes various themes from the
broader information economics literature (Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman, 2016). For exam-
ple, the disclosure of personal information can improve the allocation of goods and services
via targeted advertising or price discrimination, while secrecy potentially leads to market
failure due to adverse selection or costly signaling. We contribute to the literature by de-
veloping a neglected theme: website privacy policy inuences how consumers learn about
their tastes for a product attribute. In our model, consumers care both about their direct
utility from website services, and their match utility from third party sales. Website privacy
protection in essence is a product attribute, the value of which consumers learn imperfectly
from experience. The website chooses privacy protection with the aim of inuencing con-
sumer beliefs, but, as is typical of signal-jamming models, consumers in equilibrium see
through these incentives, and correctly predict the rms actions.11
Our work is related to the paper by Spiegel (2013) on a software producers choice
between charging consumers for the software and o¤ering for free a bundle of the software
and ads. In his model, however, consumers are perfectly informed about the utility they
derive from an impression and the rms strategy is observable to them. In a similar vein,
OBrien and Smith (2014) investigate rmsprivate incentives to o¤er customers privacy
and compare them to the socially optimal incentives. They, however, assume that sellers
can commit to privacy policies while we suppose that they cannot (in the absence of privacy
regulation). Moreover, there is no scope for learning in their model.
11To illustrate signal-jamming incentives for product quality, consider a rm selling an experience good
for which a positive experience requires both a high-quality product and a discerning consumer. More
precisely, a consumer has a positive experience with probability q, where q 2 f0; 1g is a characteristic of
the product and  2 f0; 1g is a characteristic of the consumer. In response to a positive experience, the
consumer forms a posterior belief rG = 1 of being a discerning type; otherwise, the consumers posterior
belief is rN = 0. Thus, even though quality is unobservable, the rm has an incentive for high quality
in order to convince a discerning consumer to make a repeat purchase. Our model of equilibrium privacy
provision follows a similar logic. The website invests in privacy protection to inuence consumersbeliefs
about the utility of returning to the website. See Judd and Riordan (1994) and Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn
(2013) for more elaborate signal-jamming models of product quality. Early models of signal jamming include
Riordan (1985), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), and Holmström (1999).
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Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on markets for information.12 This
literature has mainly focused on the design of information by a monopolist data seller
(e.g. Admati and Pfeiderer, 1986, 1990; Bergemann et al., 2018), the optimal policy of a
monopolist selling data to competing rms (e.g. Bounie et al., 2018; Belleamme et al.,
2019; Montes et al., 2019), and information sharing among competing rms (e.g. Vives,
1988; Raith, 1996). In contrast, we focus on the interaction between a websites decision
to sell data and consumer retention, and provide a model of competition in the market for
personal information.
Finally, the security economics literature studies positive externalities from security in-
vestments in networks with interdependent risks (e.g. Acemoglu, Malekian and Ozdaklar,
2016). Toh (2018) analyzes a websites ex ante incentive to invest in security when con-
sumers gradually learn about a websites security level, and demonstrates an underinvest-
ment problem. In contrast, our analysis examines the implications for consumer security of
a websites ex post incentive to protect consumer privacy when consumers learn about their
vulnerability to attacks, and demonstrates how a website might provide excessive privacy
protection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the baseline model.
Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis in the baseline (single-homing) scenario and
extends it to the multihoming case. Section 4 provides a welfare analysis. Section 5 analyzes
the e¤ects of transparency and opt-out policies. Section 6 addresses the extensions. Section
7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Baseline Model
Consider a website o¤ering a service to a unit-mass population of consumers for two periods:
period 1 and period 2. A consumer derives a utility u from the service, but this utility is
unknown at the beginning of period 1. Instead, this utility is perceived to be distributed
independently in the population according to a cumulative distribution function F (u) with
mean u1 and support R. Furthermore, the mean utility is large enough that all consumers
choose to participate in period 1. Each consumer learns her u upon consuming the service,
and this knowledge informs her participation decision in period 2.
In this section we consider a scenario in which there is a single website, which we refer
to as single-homing, but we later extend our setup to the case where consumers visit mul-
tiple websites, which we refer to as multi-homing. The single-homing scenario describes a
12See Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) for an excellent survey.
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situation in which a website gains unique information about consumers and sells a match-
ing service to interested third parties at the monopoly price. The multi-homing scenario
describes a situation where multiple websites get the same information about consumers
and compete to sell a homogeneous matching service. In order to focus on competition in
the market for information, we will abstract from competition for consumers.
The website o¤ers the service to consumers for free, and earns revenue from advertising.
To x ideas, suppose that the website has a single advertising slot per customer, that can
be used in one of two ways. If it is used for a non-targeted ad, it generates a revenue a > 0
per customer. If instead the ad is targeted using information collected when the customer
visits the website, it generates a revenue a + vt (per customer) in period t = 1; 2: This
information, for example, might come from tracking consumersonline activity with a cookie,
or it might be personal information that consumers disclose to the website (such as an email
or mailing address). Information may be transferred to the advertiser (directly or through
a data broker), or processed internally by the website as part of an ad display service.
Recognizing that there are several interpretations of our model, we use the short-hand
selling informationor information saleto mean a transaction with a third party, using
consumer information collected by the website, that involves a payment to the website.13
Our model is based on the premise that targeting allows specialized advertisers to reach
consumers that value most their products but also raises the risk of unwanted or malicious
targeted ads. There is evidence that targeted advertising may induce negative reactions by
consumers (White et al., 2008; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011), and the rise of malvertising
can be partly explained by the increase in the collection of personal data and the resulting
targeting opportunities (see e.g. Dwyer and Kanguri, 2017).
We capture this dual nature of targeting by assuming that it can result in three possible
consumer experiences, which impact consumer utility. With probability ; the targeted ad
results in a good experience (G) that generates a positive utility UG > 0. With probability
, the ad is a nuisance or worse, causing a disutility from a bad experience (B), with negative
utility UB < 0. We allow that disutility to be small, as in the case of mildly irritating spam,
or large, as in the case of ransomware. In all other events, the ad is inconsequential, and
the consumer has a neutral experience (N) with no utility consequences, UN = 0, which we
assume to be also the case when the ad is not targeted.14 Hence, a neutral experience occurs
with probability 1 in the absence of an information sale, and with probability 1       if
13Bergemann and Bonatti (2019) distinguish direct and indirect sales of information depending on whether
the data seller provides information or access to a consumer.
14We simplify the exposition by assuming that untargeted banner ads generate a neutral experience for
consumers. However, we could allow for all types of experiences as long as targeting increases both the
probability of a good experience and the probability of bad one.
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the website sells customer information.
For simplicity, we assume the following specic targeted advertising scenario. A unit-
mass of specialized third-party advertisers arrive each period, and each consumer in a period
is of interest to exactly one of these advertisers. In order to target its consumer of interest
with an ad, the advertiser is willing to pay a fee a + vt to secure the cooperation of the
website.15
Critically, consumers are unsure of their preferences over third-party advertising. We
model this by assuming that, while  is a known parameter,  is an unknown characteristic
of the consumer.16 Each consumer may be highly vulnerable to a bad experience, i.e.  = h,
or weakly vulnerable, i.e.  = l < h. We denote by r1 the ex ante probability of weak
vulnerability, assumed to be the same for all consumers, and 1 = r1l + (1  r1) h the ex
ante vulnerability of the consumer.
Vulnerability can be interpreted in several ways. One interpretation is mistargeted ad-
vertising:  is the probability of a nuisance ad that generates a small disutility for the
consumer, and 1       is the probability of innocuous poorly targeted ads. Another
interpretation is malvertising:  is the probability of abusive or criminal use of customer
information that imposes a large utility loss, e.g. a denial-of-service attack or identity theft.
Finally, some consumers might have a poor understanding of how well they are protected
against aggressive intrusions, for instance because of a superior antivirus or rewall, so that
intrusion by malicious third parties is more likely to fail.
A website visit thus is an experience good. During period 1, a consumer observes u,
and also experiences a good (UG), bad (UB), or a neutral (0) utility increment from third
party ads. The consumer learns about her  from the realized experience. At the end of
period 1, a consumer knows her value of the website service, and revises her beliefs about
vulnerability. We will denote by r the updated probability that the type is l. The same
situation repeats in period 2 for returning consumers, except that the value of targeting for
third parties is v2.
In our baseline model, the privacy policy of the website determines the probability
X 2 [0; 1] that customer information is not sold in period 1.17 For instance, the website
15This scenario can be interpreted as a special case of the one considered in Bergemann and Bonatti
(2015) where a databasemaps consumer-advertisers pairs into a match valuefor the advertiser, which
is equal to vt on the diagonal of the corresponding matrix and 0 elsewhere. A queryby a third-party is
a request to identify the unique consumer with match value vt.
16We make this assumption to emphasize the role of learning from a bad experience. However, we discuss
in an extension the implications of allowing  to be unknown as well. Note also that for most purposes, 
could be alternatively interpreted as an unknown attribute of websites.
17More specically, a privacy policy that restricts what consumer information a website collects and how
it is used might reduce the ability of the website to match consumers and interested third parties.
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could sell access to a database the content of which depends on its privacy policy. Each
advertiser might nd the database useful, or not, for the purpose of targeting customers.
Thus the design of the database determines the probability that an advertiser seeking access
to a given consumer nds him and buys the targeting service.18 We will refer to X as (the
level of) precaution, and say we have full precaution when X = 1, no precaution if X = 0,
and partial precaution if 0 < X < 1.19
Website privacy policy is unobserved by consumers. In equilibrium, consumers update
beliefs about their vulnerability using Bayes Rule and taking as given the websites privacy
policy, and the website chooses a prot-maximizing policy given consumer beliefs. Equilib-
rium and its welfare and policy implications are analyzed next. Later, we consider a richer
privacy policy in which the website also can incur a cost to verify third party use of customer
information prior to its sale.
3 Equilibrium precaution
3.1 Single-homing
Website privacy policy and consumer beliefs are determined jointly in equilibrium. A website
has an incentive for privacy protection only if the long-run value of retaining a customer
(V2) is su¢ ciently high relative to the short-rung gain from exposing the customer to third
parties (v1). The probability of retention (Q (r)) depends on consumersbeliefs about the
utility of returning to the website, which depends on consumersexpectations of privacy.
Furthermore, the distribution of beliefs in the consumer population, and therefore average
retention, depends on the websites privacy policy. In equilibrium, consumers correctly
anticipate privacy, and the website correctly anticipates how privacy a¤ects retention.
Our two-period model gives specic content to this notion of equilibrium. It is immediate
that the website sells information to all interested third parties at price v2 in period 2, as
there is no further interaction with the customer. Hence the value of retention is V2 =
18Alternatively, we can intepret X = 0 (resp. X = 1) as meaning that the website always (resp. never)
sells customer information to a third party and interpret X 2 (0; 1) as a mixed strategy. Note that the
latter can be puriedby introducing into the model a vanishingly small amount of incomplete information
about the value of personal information to third parties. See, for instance, Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002).
19Note that, in deriving equilibrium, we can fully characterize the second period with the retention value
V2 and the retention rate Q(r), suggesting our model admits alternative interpretations. For example,
setting  = 0 and v2 = 0, we could interpret v1X as an investment to protect consumer data, pB(X) as
the probability of a security breach,  UB as possible consumer harm, r as the consumers beliefs about
her vulnerability, and V2 as the average prot from serving consumers. See Toh (2018) for a more elaborate
model of security investment with a similarly structured equilibrium.
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F (a+ v2) where 
F is the rms discount factor. The retention probability for a given
posterior belief r is
Q (r)  1  F ( M (r)) ;
where
M(r)  UG + (rl + (1  r) h)UB
is the expected benet from third party matching when the probability of low vulnerability
is r. Posterior beliefs, denoted (rG; rB; rN), are the updated probabilities that  = l at the
beginning of period 2 after the events G, B, and N are observed by the consumer. For the
most part, we focus on scenarios with M (r1)  0, meaning consumers in period 1 have no
objection to third party matching. Heterogeneity of posterior beliefs, however, allows that
consumers may disagree on the desirability of third party matching in period 2.
Precaution determines the distribution of consumer beliefs at the beginning of period 2.
The probability of a good experience (eventG) and the probability of a bad experience (event
B) are respectively pG (X) =  (1 X) and pB (X) = 1 (1 X). Both are decreasing in
precaution; it follows that the probability of a neutral experience (event N), pN (X) =
1  pG (X)  pB (X), is increasing in precaution.
Consumer beliefs at the beginning of period 2 are formed using Bayes Rule, conditioning
on realized experience and taking precautionX as given. Posterior beliefs after events G and
B are respectively rG = r1 and rB = (l=1) r1 < r1. Notice that rG and rB are independent
ofX, and therefore can be treated as parameters.20 This is because these events occur only if
information is sold, and the websites strategy does not a¤ect the conditional probabilities of
these events. EventN , however, can occur whether or not information is sold. Consequently,
a consumers posterior belief that  = l after a neutral experience depends on anticipated
precaution:
rN =  (X)  1  (+ l) (1 X)
1  (+ 1) (1 X)r1; (1)
Of course, posterior and prior beliefs must be consistent:
pG (X) rG + pN (X) rN + pB (X) rB = r1:
A neutral experience is good news in our model in the sense that, for all levels of
precaution less than full, it yields the most optimistic posterior belief about vulnerability:
rB < r1 < rN . The intuition behind this result is as follows. Provided X < 1, the consumer
20rG and rB are not dened by Bayes rule under full privacy (i.e. X = 1). We assume that their values
remain equal to r1 and (l=1) r1, respectively, in this case.
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reasons that a neutral experience could have resulted from the possibility that a third
party did gain access to the consumer but the consumer had a neutral experience due to
low vulnerability. Thus the consumer becomes more optimistic after a neutral experience.
Moreover,  (X) decreases in precaution because, by reducing exposure to third parties,
higher precaution reduces the likelihood that a neutral experience results from low consumer
vulnerability rather than from information not being sold. When there is full precaution,
however, the consumer is never exposed to third parties and a neutral experience conveys
no information:  (1) = r1:
We are now in a position to characterize equilibrium and provide some comparative static
results. Given the posterior beliefs, the website has an incentive for full (no) precaution if
and only if
L (rN)  v1 + [Q (rG) + 1Q (rB) + (1    1)Q (rN)]V2  () Q (rN)V2:
The intuition behind the equilibrium is then as follows. Selling customer information in
period 1 yields extra revenue v1, but raises both the probability of a good experience by
 and the probability of a bad experience by 1, which reduces the retention probability
by  [Q (rN) Q (rG)] + 1 [Q (rN) Q (rB)], sacricing future revenue proportionally. In
terms of second-period payo¤, the total gain from being cautious and not selling information
is then
P (rN) = V2 f1 [Q (rN) Q (rB)] +  [Q (rN) Q (rG)]g :
The optimal strategy for the website is thus dened by the following best responsecorre-
spondence:
Xbr (rN) 2 arg max
X2[0;1]
fa+ L (rN) +XP (rN) Xv1g ; (2)
where the term between brackets is the websites expected prot. The best response corre-
spondence optimizes the trade-o¤ between avoiding bad experience and selling information.
Notice that the gain from precaution decreases with rN 2 [r1;  (0)] and lies in the interval
 fV2   v1;  nV2   v1

where
 f  (1 + )Q (r1)  1Q (rB)  Q (rG) <  n  (1 + )Q ( (0))  1Q (rB)  Q (rG) :
(3)
If  fV2  v1 < 0 <  nV2  v1, the level of precaution Xbr (rN) jumps from full precaution to
no precaution when the posterior belief induced by neutral experience crosses a threshold
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rM 2 (r1;  (0)) : This threshold is dened (uniquely) as the solution of
P
 
rM

= v1: (4)
At rN = rM ; the website is indi¤erent between all levels of precaution. An equilibrium is a
level of precaution X and a consumer belief rN such that r

N =  (X
) and X = Xbr (rN).
Proposition 1 A unique equilibrium exists under single-homing. Equilibrium precaution
is non-increasing in the relative value of information v1=V2 and the website chooses full
precaution if v1=V2   f ; partial precaution (rN = rM) if v1=V2 2
 
 f ;  n

and no precaution
if v1=V2   n:
This result implies that v1=V2 is a negative indicator for equilibrium precaution. Rewrit-
ing this indicator as

F (a=v1 + v2=v1)
 1
, we see that equilibrium precaution increases
with the relative share of income not raising privacy concerns and with the growth rate
of the value of information over time. Therefore, everything held equal, we expect more
precaution by an e-seller relying extensively on merchandising than by a social network rely-
ing extensively on monetization of personal information. Similarly, the website exerts more
precaution if a long history record is more valued than a short history record. Furthermore,
equilibrium precaution is non-decreasing in the sensitivity of retention to beliefs about vul-
nerability measured by the slope of Q (r) for r  rB, and in the sensitivity of beliefs to
experience measured by the (absolute value of the) slope of  (X) for X 2 [0; 1].21
Example 1 To illustrate the above comparative statics and provide comparative statics with
respect to other parameters of the model, assume that l = 0 (hence rB = 0), u is distributed
uniformly over an interval [u; u] with density  on its support and the retention rate is
always interior (i.e. u <  M (1) <  M (0) < u). In this case, we obtain
 f = 2h(1  r1)r1 jUBj ;  n =
2h(1  r1)r1 jUBj
1  [+ (1  r1)h]
and
X = 1  1  
2
h(1  r1)r1 jUBj V2v1
+ (1  r1)h for
v1
V2
2  f ;  n :
The level of precaution does not depend on UG as it does not a¤ect the sensitivity of re-
tention to consumer beliefs. It is increasing in jUBj, , h, and r1: precaution is higher
21Notice that increasing Q0(r) for all r  rB raises the height of B(r)   G (r) for all r  r1, while
increasing j0(X)j for all X increases the height of  (X), except at X = 1 since  (1) = r1.
12
when matches are less likely to generate a neutral experience and bad matches are more
detrimental to consumers. The e¤ect of the prior belief r1 is non-monotonic. For extreme
levels of prior beliefs, the threshold  n becomes very small as the posterior beliefs do not
react to information and  (0) is close to r1: Hence, there is no precaution if consumers are
very condent they are not vulnerable, or if they strongly believe that they are vulnerable.
Precaution emerges only for intermediate prior beliefs and in this case is decrease in r1 for
a large prior r1 but increasing for a small prior and a small price of information v1 (i.e.
close to  fV2):22 The next graph plots the equilibrium level of precaution X as a function of
v1=V2 and r1 for  = 1; jUBj = 10 and  = h = 1=3 :
1.0
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0.8
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0.0
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3.2 Multi-homing
Let us now consider K  2 websites facing a unit-mass population of consumers in periods
1 and 2. Each website is as in the previous single-homing setting, except that consumers
derive a utility ui from visiting website i that follows a joint distribution FK
 
u1; :::uK

,
which we assume to be symmetric with marginal cumulative distribution F (ui). Websites
are not competitors on the consumer side. We assume that websites are ex ante symmetric
so that consumers multi-home and are active on all websites in period 1. This implies that
all websites have access to all customer information and can potentially sell it to each third
party.
22Formally @X

@r1
= h
(+(1 r1)h)2

2h(1  r1)r1 jUB j V2v1   1

+ 1 2r1+(1 r1)h
2
h jUB j V2v1 :
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In a setting with multiple websites, two issues arise: attribution and inference. The
rst relates to the fact that a consumer having a bad experience may not know which
website is responsible for the sale of her personal information. Inference refers to the way
a consumer revises her beliefs on each website after a given experience, which depends in
particular on the correlation of the vulnerability across websites. Both imperfect attribution
and correlation induce a collective reputationproblem as the sale of personal information
by one website a¤ects all websites. To highlight this aspect we assume that consumers do
not observe if information is sold or not, and by whom, and that the parameter  is the same
for all websites. We show below that even under these extreme assumptions the market may
provide some privacy protection.23
Given our maintained assumption that there is a one-to-one match between consumers
and third parties, each consumer faces the same potential outcomes as before: she can either
have one good experience (G), one bad experience (B), or a neutral experience (N). The
consumer then revises her beliefs about her vulnerability to bad experiences, observes the
realization of
 
u1; :::uK

, and decides whether to return to the websites.
A new feature here is that the probability of a non-neutral experience accounts for
the fact that many websites can sell information. Thus, if x is a symmetric equilibrium
probability that a website does not sell customer information, the total probability that a
third party interested in buying such information does not acquire it (aggregate precaution)
is X = xK . Notice that we assume independent probabilities that a third-party transacts
with a website.24With this adjustment in the determination ofX, the behavior of consumers
is unchanged with respect to the single-homing scenario and, in particular, the equilibrium
posterior beliefs for events G; B and N are respectively rG; rB and rN =  (X) :
We model competition by assuming that all websites decide independently and simul-
taneously on x and the price p for personal information. We assume for simplicity that all
websites observe when information is sold but do not observe consumersexperiences. On
the market for information, multi-homing a¤ects the selling prices in both periods. Let us
rst consider period 2. A consumer with posterior belief r returns to a given website i with
23Our conclusion would extend to the case where vulnerability is website-specic, with i denoting vul-
nerability on website i; if either the consumer cannot attribute perfectly a bad or good experience to a
website or the parameters i are positively correlated.
24This is the case if x is interpreted as a mixed strategy, or if websites collect di¤erent relevant pieces of
information and third-parties need only one piece of relevant information.
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probability QK (r). Assuming zero probability of a tie ui = uj; this probability is:25
QK (r)  Pr
(
ui  0;
X
j=1;K
max
 
uj; 0
   M (r))+Pr0 > ui   M (r) ; ui > max
j 6=i
uj

:
Note that the retention rate under multi-homing is smaller than the retention rate under
single-homing, i.e. QK (r) < Q (r), if and only if the expected utility from third-party
matching M (r) is positive.
The website obtains prot a on each retained consumer and competes with other websites
for the sale of personal information. If information is not sold in period 1, then the
equilibrium expected revenue of a website in period 2 from selling information on returning
customers is v2Q^K (rN) ; where (again assuming zero probability of a tie):26
Q^K (r)  Pr

ui   M (r) ;min  ui; 0 > max
1jK; j 6=i
uj

is the probability of unique customer retention, i.e. the probability that a customer returns
only to website i: Obviously, Q^K (r)  Q (r). The expression of the equilibrium prot
can be obtained as follows. Each website where the consumer is still active knows that
the consumer had a neutral experience but does not know on which other websites she
returned.27 The equilibrium symmetric strategy of the pricing game (on the market for
information) in period 2 is then a mixed strategy on an interval (a standard undercutting
argument shows that there are neither mass points nor holes). The website earns the same
expected prot for all prices in the interval. Moreover, as the upper bound of that interval
wins only if there is no other bid (which happens with probability Q^K (rN)), it has to be v2.
This yields the expected payo¤ v2Q^K (rN). Thus, if information is not sold by any website
in period 1, the period 2 discounted expected revenue from returning consumers is
F
h
aQK (rN) + v2Q^K (rN)
i
:
If information is sold in period 1, then the equilibrium period 2 expected revenue is similar
25In the case of perfect correlation, i.e. ui = uj for all i and j; we have QK (r) =
Pr

ui  max f0; M (r) =Kg	+ 1K Pr0 > ui   M (r)	 :
26In the case of perfect correlation, we have Q^K (r) = 1K Pr

0 > ui   M (r)	 ; which is equal to zero
when M (r) is negative.
27Alternatively, we could assume that websites track consumers and know where they return. In this case,
the equilibrium price of information in the second period is v2 if there is a monopoly and 0 if the consumer
returns to two or more websites. A websites expected payo¤ would then be the same.
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but accounts for uncertainty on the posterior belief r. Viewed from period 1, it is given by
LK (rN)  E
n
F
h
aQK (r) + v2Q^K (r)
i
j information is sold in period 1
o
.
Let us now turn to competition on the market for information in period 1. At this stage of
the game, the strategy of a website can be summarized by the choice of x and a probability
distribution over prices p  v1 with cumulative distribution function H (p) :28 We now
characterize a symmetric equilibrium of the game. Let us rst derive the websites optimal
strategy for a given consumer belief rN , assuming that all other websites follow the strategy
(x;H(:)). For this purpose, dene
PK (rN)  Fa f [QK (rN) QK (rG)] + 1 [QK (rN) QK (rB)]g
+Fv2
n

h
Q^K (rN)  Q^K (rG)
i
+ 1
h
Q^K (rN)  Q^K (rB)
io
;
which is the expected increase in payo¤ from retaining a consumer when no information
about the consumer is sold to third parties. Given that QK (rN) and Q^K (rN) are both
increasing in rN , PK (rN) is positive and non-decreasing in rN : Then, the expected payo¤
of a website choosing xi and pi  v1 is
a+ LK (rN) + xix
K 1PK (rN) + (1  xi) (x+ (1  x) (1 H (pi)))K 1 pi: (5)
This expression can be interpreted as follows. Not selling customer information does not
imply that access to that information by a third party will not occur because another website
may sell the information. In that scenario, the payo¤ is LK (rN) : However, with probability
xK 1, all other websites also do not sell the information and the payo¤ is then higher by
PK (rN). Finally, information is sold by the website if the third party is willing to buy
and either no other website sells relevant information or the websites price is the lowest
price. Therefore, the comparison of the payo¤ from selling information at a price p below v1
and the payo¤ from not selling information boils down to comparing the expected revenue
(x+ (1  x) (1 H (p)))K 1 p with the gain from privacy PK (rN)xK 1.
Equilibrium is not necessarily unique in a multi-homing environment. The following
result shows that one of the possible outcomes is that all websites sell personal information
to any interested third party and competition dissipates fully their prots from data sales.
28We could allow the price to be above v1 without altering the analysis. In this case x would be replaced
by x0 = x + 1   H (p) : Given that putting a mass above v1 is equivalent to increasing x; we ignore this
possibility. See, however, our discussion of transparency.
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Proposition 2 In the multi-homing scenario (K  2), there always exists a no-precaution
equilibrium where all websites quote a zero price for information, and information is always
sold.
Thus, as soon as there are at least two websites that can sell the same personal information,
there is a risk of a total collapse in the provision of privacy.29 The next proposition shows,
however, that there also exists a symmetric equilibrium with a positive level of precaution,
denoted XK , if the value of information v1 is not too high.
Proposition 3 Consider the multi-homing scenario (K  2). There exists a symmetric
equilibrium with positive precaution (i.e., XK > 0) if and only if v1 < PK ( (0)). It is
uniquely dened as follows:
- If v1  PK ( (1)) ; then the websites provide full precaution (i.e., XK = 1).
- If PK ( (1)) < v1 < PK ( (0)) ; then the websiteslevel of precaution and price distri-
bution are given by
v1 = PK ( (X

K)) ;
H (p) =
1  (XK)
1
K

v1
p
 1
K 1
1  (XK)
1
K
for p 2 [(XK)
K 1
K v1; v1]:
Notice that the level of precaution would not be a¤ected by the number of websites if it
was commonly known that the consumer would return to one website only.30 Indeed, given
that the marginal distribution of any ui is assumed to be F regardless of the number of
websites, we would have QK (r) = Q^K (r) = Q(r) = 1   F ( M (r)) and, therefore, XK =
X: Hence, the e¤ect of multi-homing on the equilibrium level of rst-period precaution
is related to the negative e¤ect of second-period multi-homing on the websites returns to
privacy.
From Proposition 3 it follows that XK < X
 if and only if PK (rN) < P (r

N), i.e. if and
only if a websites expected net gain from being cautious is smaller under multi-homing than
under single-homing. The following proposition provides su¢ cient conditions under which
this condition holds.
Proposition 4 Consider the multi-homing scenario (K  2).
29However, we conjecture that if there is an arbitrarily small mass " of single-homing consumers, the
zero-price equilibrium exhibited in Proposition 2 exists only if v1  B (rN ) G (rN ) :
30This is the case for instance if only one website generates utility ui > u while all others generate a large
negative utility u.
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(i) If consumer preferences are perfectly correlated across websites then equilibrium ag-
gregate precaution is lower than in the single-homing scenario (XK  X):
(ii) Alternatively, if Pr (uj > 0jui) > 0 for j 6= i, then equilibrium aggregate precaution is
lower than in the single-homing scenario (XK  X) if a=v2 is small enough or M (rB) > 0.
Multi-homing tends to dissipate future prots due competition in the market for in-
formation. This suggests that websitesmarginal gain from inducing more optimistic be-
liefs about vulnerability through higher precaution is lower under multi-homing than under
single-homing. Proposition 4 identies su¢ cient conditions under which this intuition holds.
However, multi-homing has another e¤ect stemming from participation externalities exerted
by each website on the others. Under the assumption that websites do not compete in the
market for consumers, participation by consumers at a website boosts participation at other
websites if the expected matching value is negative. In this case, a website inducing more
optimistic beliefs gets not only a direct benet but also an indirect benet resulting from
higher consumer participation at other websites. Therefore, it seems possible in general
that websites gain from inducing more optimistic beliefs through higher precaution in-
creases with multi-homing. However, this is not to the case for the following extension of
Example 1 to multi-homing.
Example 2 We now extend the setting considered in Example 1 to a scenario with K = 2.
We assume that u1 and u2 are independently drawn from the same uniform distribution
over [u; u] with density  over its support and such that u < 0 < u. We suppose again that
l = 0; hence that rB = 0; and that all retention rates are interior (i.e., u <  M (1)) <
 M (0) < u). We show in the Appendix that the unique retention rate is given by
Q^2(r) =
(
2
  1
2
M (r)2   uM (r)  uu if M (r)  0
2 ( uM (r)  uu) if M (r) < 0
and the total retention rate is
Q2 (r) = 
2

 1
2
M (r)2   uM (r)

+ u.
Assume now that M(r1)  0 > M(0): We compute in the Appendix P2(rN) using the
expressions of Q^2(r) and Q2 (r) provided above and establish that P2(rN) < P (rN): This
implies that equilibrium aggregate precaution in the multihoming secnario with two websites
is lower than equilibrium precaution in the single-homing scenario.
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4 Welfare
Before turning to public policies intended to enhance privacy in the next section, we dene
our measures of welfare, and then discuss the divergence between social and equilibrium
incentives for precaution.
Denote by U (rN ; X) the expected utility of a consumer for given beliefs and a given
level of aggregate precaution. It is useful to decompose U into a short-term component plus
a long-term component:
U (rN ; X)  U1 (X) + CU2 (rN ; X)
where U1 (X)  Ku1 + (1 X)M (r1) is the expected utility of consumers in period 1
with a prior belief r1, U2 (rN ; X) is the expected utility of consumers in period 2 with zero
precaution in that period, i.e.
U2 (rN ; X)  E
(
max
 
max
Jf1;::;Kg
X
k2J
uk +M (r) ; 0
!
j X
)
;
and C is consumers discount factor. The marginal e¤ect of precaution on short-term
utility is equal to the loss of match utility M (r1), which in general can be either positive
or negative. The following lemma, however, establishes that greater precaution always
decreases long-term consumer utility inclusive of its e¤ect on beliefs.
Lemma 1 U2 ( (X) ; X) is decreasing in X.
It follows that consumer expected utility is decreasing in precaution if beliefs adjust to
changes in precaution and M(r1) is not too negative.
Multi-homing has mixed e¤ects on consumer welfare. Obviously, access to a greater
number of websites directly increases the utility consumers get from website content. More-
over, under conditions of Proposition 4 or Example 2, equilibrium precaution is lower under
multi-homing, which increases long-run utility. Short-term utility, however, increases only
if the ex ante match utility is positive.
For a given belief rN (and treating rG and rB as parameters) and a symmetric equilibrium
with aggregate precaution X, a website makes an expected prot
K (rN ; X)  a+

X
K 1
K  X

v1| {z }
prot in period 1
+ LK (rN) +XPK (rN)| {z }
discounted prot in period 2
:
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This expression follows from (5) by taking xi = X
1
K and pi = v1.31 As retention rate QK and
unique retention rate Q^K are both increasing in rN ; holding X constant, an improvement
in consumer beliefs increases expected prot, i.e. @K (rN ; X) =@rN > 0. Moreover, in
the single-homing scenario (K = 1), the website internalizes the e¤ect of precaution on
consumersexperience. Thus, for an interior equilibrium with rN =  (X), the overall e¤ect
of precaution reduces to its negative impact on retention through the change in consumer
belief. However, when K > 1; there are countervailing positive e¤ects resulting from the
fact that a website selling information exerts a negative externality on the other websites,
i.e. @K ( (XK) ; X

K) =@X > 0. Thus, in the single-homing case, the website would benet
from lower precaution, i.e. d( (X) ; X) =dX < 0,32 while in the multi-homing case the
e¤ect of lower precaution on websitesprots is ambiguous because of two opposite e¤ects:
dK ( (X

K) ; X

K)
dX
= 0 (XK)
@K ( (X

K) ; X)
@rN| {z }
<0
+
@K ( (X

K) ; X

K)
@X| {z }
>0
:
Multi-homing has mixed e¤ects on websitesprots. The direct e¤ect of multi-homing on
websitesrst-period prots is negative because another website may sell customer informa-
tion, which is captured by X
K 1
K < 1: The e¤ect of multi-homing on second-period prots
is in general ambiguous. On the one hand, multi-homing makes the unique retention rate
Q^K smaller, which tends to decrease the second-period prot conditional on information
being sold in the rst period, i.e. LK (rN). It also makes the unique retention rate less sen-
sitive to beliefs, which tends to decrease the return from precaution PK (rN). On the other
hand, multihoming increases the retention rate of consumers whose expected utility from
third-party matching is negative but decreases the retention rate of those whose expected
utility from third-party matching is positive, with ambiguous e¤ects on LK (rN). Finally,
the impact of multi-homing on the sensitivity of total retention is in general ambiguous
but under the conditions of Proposition 4, multi-homing leads to a decrease in the return
from precaution PK (rN). Note, however, that the e¤ect of multi-homing is unambiguously
negative if the expected utility from third-party matching is always positive, i.e. M(rB) > 0.
Let us now consider the joint prot of websites and third parties. Dene
~QK (r)  Pr
(
max
Jf1;::;Kg
X
k2J
uk   M (r)
)
;
31Recall that each website is indi¤erent between all prices in the support of the equilibrium price distri-
bution.
32For notational consistency, we denote , instead of 1, the websites expected prot in the single-homing
scenario.
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which is the probability that a consumer returns to at least one website in the second
period. Then, assuming that websites and third parties have the same discount factor, their
discounted joint second-period prot if information is sold is
~LK (rN)  E
n
F
h
KaQK (r) + v2 ~Q (r)
i
j information is sold in period 1
o
:
Not selling information increases this prot by
~PK (rN)  FKa f [QK (rN) QK (rG)] + 1 [QK (rN) QK (rB)]g
+Fv2
n

h
~Q (rN)  ~Q (rG)
i
+ 1
h
~Q (rN)  ~Q (rB)
io
:
Hence, the joint prot of websites and third-parties is
~K (rN ; X)  Ka+ ~LK (rN) +X ~PK (rN) + (1 X) v1
which is increasing in beliefs rN and precautionX; because ~PK (rN) is greater thanKPK (rN),33
and therefore greater than v1 = PK (rN).
Let us now turn to total welfare. Expected total welfare for given beliefs and precaution
is
W (rN ; X)  ~K (rN ; X) + U (rN ; X) :
Clearly, there is a divergence between equilibrium and social incentives for precaution. First,
websites ignore the direct e¤ect of precaution on consumer expected utility. Second, websites
do not internalize the e¤ect of their actions on other websites and third parties. Third,
because precaution is unobservable, websites cannot control consumer beliefs. Finally, it
may be desirable to have some privacy protection in period 2 if M(r) < 0 for a su¢ ciently
large fraction of consumers in the second period.
We may then distinguish two extreme cases depending on whether match utility is pos-
itive or negative. In the optimisticcase, match utility is positive for all relevant beliefs.
Then, with single-homing, equilibrium precaution in period 1 is necessarily excessive be-
cause both consumers and websites prefer less precaution and third parties are indi¤erent.
Furthermore, if M(rB) > 0, then zero precaution in period 2 is e¢ cient. However, with
multi-homing, websites may prefer more precaution to internalize competitive externalities.
33To see this, notice that ~Q (r) = KQ^K (r)+Pr
(P
j
max
 
uj ; 0
   M (r) ;ui > 0 and uj > 0 for some i 6= j)
where the second term is the probability of at least 2 websites being visited, which is increasing in r: Hence
~Q0 (r) > KQ^0K (r) implying ~P (r) > KPK(r):
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In the pessimisticcase, expected match utility is negative for the relevant beliefs, and the
social desirability of precaution is ambiguous for additional reasons. First, zero precaution
in period 2 is ine¢ cient. Second, consumers might prefer more precaution in period 1,
depending on whether the short-term utility gain outweighs the long-term utility loss. In
between these extremes, the welfare e¤ects of raising precaution above the equilibrium level
are ambiguous.
Which case is more salient depends on the nature of customer information and the
perceived consumer risks. For example, disclosure of highly sensitive health information may
be perceived to cause negative match utility. Alternatively, negative match utility depends
on the extent to which information sharing exposes the consumer to malicious attacks. On
the one hand, nuisance advertising or innocuous spam might cause only a minor annoyance
(small jUBj), that is overshadowed by mutually benecial targeted advertising (relatively
large jUGj). On the other hand, even a small possibility of identity theft due to phishing or
malware (very large jUBj) could weigh heavily on match utility. Whether the optimistic case
or the pessimistic case is more salient might ultimately depend on policymakersperceptions
of the extent to which online advertising platforms, or other forms of information sharing,
increase consumersrisk of becoming victims of serious cybercrime.
5 Policy
5.1 Transparency policy
How should a policy governing privacy protection be conducted? One salient policy inter-
vention is to enforce transparency regarding the websites collection and use of personal
data. In our setup, transparency may relate to ex post disclosure of information sales or
to ex ante commitment on information that may be sold. For instance, transparency in the
European GDPR is of the latter type. A key issue is the extent to which a transparency
policy makes credible an announced privacy policy.
Ex post transparency Under ex post transparency, each website chooses precaution at
the beginning of period t and discloses its value once trade with third parties has been
completed. Assuming this is aggregate information, each consumer knows the probability to
be matched with a third party by each website at the end of period t but not the realized
matches. A direct implication is that in our model, all websites still want to trade with all
third parties in the second period because ex post revelation of second-period precaution
does not a¤ect demand. A di¤erence from the case in which precaution is unobservable
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is that the website directly a¤ects posterior beliefs with its choice of precaution. In the
single-homing scenario, since prot is increasing in consumer belief rN , it is immediate that
the website will change X in the direction that raises rN . This is driven by the fact that
the website would benet from consumers interpreting a neutral experience as a stronger
signal about their low vulnerability.
Lemma 2 (i) Consider the single-homing scenario (K = 1). An ex post transparency equi-
librium precaution level ~X satises:
- v1  P ( (1)) + 0 (1) [L0( (1)) + P 0( (1)] for ~X = 1;
- v1 = P



~X

+ 0

~X
 h
L0(

~X

) + ~XP 0(

~X
i
for ~X 2 (0; 1) :
- v1  P ( (0)) + 0 (0)L0K( (0)) for ~X = 0.
Let us now consider the e¤ect of a transparency policy under multi-homing, focusing on
symmetric equilibria with precaution. The analysis of an ex post transparency equilibrium
is similar to the baseline multi-homing case. A di¤erence with the case of a non-transparent
policy is that websites internalize the negative e¤ect of precaution on consumersposterior
beliefs and retention rates.
Lemma 3 Consider the multi-homing scenario (K  2). An ex post transparency symmet-
ric equilibrium with positive aggregate precaution ~XK satises:
- v1  PK ( (1)) + 0 (1) [L0K( (1)) + P 0K( (1)] for ~XK = 1;
- v1 = PK



~XK

+ 0

~XK
 h
L0K(

~XK

) + ~XKP
0
K(

~XK
i
for ~XK 2 (0; 1)
and
H (p) =
1 

~XK
 1
K

v1
p
 1
K 1
1  (XK)
1
K
for p 2 [

~XK
K 1
K
v1; v1].
We provide in the proof of Lemma 3 conditions for existence and uniqueness of a sym-
metric equilibrium with positive precaution, although we lack simple intuitive conditions
because the private return to privacy under ex post transparency is not necessarily de-
creasing in precaution. We do, however, have a general result about the comparison of
equilibrium precaution with and without ex post transparency.
Proposition 5 - In the single-homing scenario (K = 1), the equilibrium precaution level
in the absence of ex post transparency is (weakly) higher than the precaution level in any
equilibrium under ex post transparency.
- In the multi-homing scenario (K  2), if a symmetric equilibrium with positive aggre-
gate precaution exists in the absence of ex post transparency, then this equilibrium features
a (weakly) higher precaution than any symmetric equilibrium under ex post transparency.
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Ex post transparency regulation always increases consumer long-term utility by improv-
ing the learning process. Thus, when the expected value from a match for consumers is
positive (M (r1) > 0) or consumers are su¢ ciently patient (
C is large), consumers benet
from such a regulation. However, if M (r1) < 0, then consumers are negatively a¤ected
by a weaker privacy policy in the rst period, creating a tension between short-term and
long-term e¤ects on consumer utility.
Ex ante transparency A policy enforcing ex ante transparency induces revelation of a
websites precaution level in a given period before consumers decide on whether they visit
the website in that period. This plausibly enables the website to credibly commit to greater
precaution than the equilibrium level, i.e. enforces an announced lower bound on precaution.
For example, the website might commit to more precaution by promising (transparently)
to collect less data about consumers, which compromises the websites ability to match
consumers and interested third parties. In this case, it may be protable for a website to
exert some precaution in the second period, when this boosts demand. The next lemma
provides su¢ cient conditions for this not to occur under single-homing.
Lemma 4 Consider the single-homing scenario (K = 1) and assume thatM (r1)  0. Under
ex ante transparency, the website exerts no precaution in the second period if either (i)M(rB)
is not too negative, or (ii) 1 is small enough, or (iii) uF 0 (u) is concave.
We have shown that in the single-homing scenario the website wants to commit to less
rather than more precaution in period 1 in order to improve customer retention after a
neutral experience. But it is not clear how the website credibly commits to less precaution.
For example, suppose the website announces that it will collect additional personal data
about its customers, potentially improving matching with interested third parties. The
website would still have the ability and the incentive to refuse to deal with interested third
parties, as long as the refusal is unobservable to consumers and did not violate its announced
privacy policy. In other words, a commitment to reduce precaution is not credible.34 In
this case, a policy enforcing ex ante transparency, without also sanctioning refusals to deal,
would have no e¤ect on equilibrium precaution, under the condition that no-precaution in
the second period is optimal for the website, as stated in Lemma 4. The following proposition
summarizes the above discussion.
34Formally, if the website were to announce X < X; the equilibrium would be in mixed strategies with
the website refusing to sell with positive probability, such that the probability of a match is X:
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Proposition 6 Consider the single-homing scenario (K = 1). Under the conditions of
Lemma 4, a regulation enforcing ex ante transparency causes the website to choose the same
privacy policy as in the equilibrium with no transparency.
Consider now the multi-homing scenario. As in the single homing case, committing to
some precaution in the second period may reduce or increase the average retention rates.
Moreover, ex ante transparency implies that a rms precaution level is observed before price
competition takes place. As a consequence, raising the level of precaution induces competing
sellers of information to raise their prices. Due to this strategic e¤ect, there is no simple
extension of Lemma 4 to the multi-homing scenario.35 As an illustration, no precaution
cannot be an equilibrium if a = 0 and preferences are perfectly correlated, because in this
case websites have no revenue from sales of information if none of them commits to some
positive level of precaution. By contrast, when a is large relative to v1, websites commit to
no-precaution in the second period if refraining from selling information depresses expected
demand. Nevertheless, we can provide conditions under which no-precaution in the second
period is an equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 5 Consider the multi-homing scenario with K = 2 and M (r1)  0. Under ex ante
transparency, no-precaution remains an equilibrium outcome in the second period if v2 is
small enough and either M(rB) is not too negative or 1 is small enough.
Consider the rst period. Assuming that information is sold to all interested third parties
in the second period, reducing the level of precaution may not be credible if the website
can refuse to sell. In particular, starting from the equilibrium precaution level x = (XK)
1
K ,
a website who deviates and announces xi < (XK)
1
K would refuse to sell with probability y
such that y + (1  y)xi = (XK)
1
K : The equilibrium distribution of prices and the market
level of precaution would then be una¤ected. Hence the equilibrium obtained under ex post
transparency would not be credible under ex ante transparency, suggesting that equilibrium
precaution is not a¤ected.
However, with multiple websites competing on the market for information, a website
will also care about the e¤ect of its policy on the intensity of competition. In particular,
35Denoting Q^ (x1; x2) and Q (x1; x2) the unique and total retention rates if the websites precaution is x1
and the other websites precaution is x2; it can be shown that with K = 2 websites, no precaution is an
equilibrium if for all x 2 [0; 1] :
(1  x)

(1  x) Q^ (0; x) + xQ (0; x)
 Q (x; 0)
Q (0; x)
 Q^ (x; 0) :
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a commitment to a higher level of precaution than under a non-transparent policy, i.e.
xi > (X

K)
1
K , is credible and would induce competitors to price less aggressively. The
reason is that rm is data becomes less attractive, which allows competitors to raise prices
without changing the probability of sale. If this e¤ect is strong, which occurs when XK is
small enough, the websites would deviate from (XK)
1
K toward higher precaution. In this
case, we show in Section 1 of the Online Appendix that there does not exist an equilibrium
in which websites choose pure precaution strategies. However, we also show that if XK is
large enough, which holds if v1 is small enough, then there exists a symmetric equilibrium
in which all websites chooses (XK)
1
K in period 1.
Proposition 7 Consider the multi-homing scenario. If v1 is small enough and no-precaution
remains an equilibrium outcome in the second period, then the symmetric equilibrium with
no transparency is also an equilibrium under ex ante transparency.
5.2 Opt-out
Another salient policy measure is to give consumers control rights over their personal infor-
mation. Ideally, a consumer would like to choose which third parties can access her personal
information, and for what purposes. However, contracts typically are incomplete do to pri-
vate information and lack of veriability. Here, we assume that whether information is sold
is veriable, but that the nature of the match (good, bad, or neutral) is not. We modify
the previous models by allowing consumers to opt out, meaning they can prevent any sale
of personal information i.e. full precaution prevails for those consumers.36
We assume u1 is su¢ ciently high that consumers do not want to opt out in the rst
period, but a consumer might want to do so after revising beliefs about her vulnerability.
Thus, at the end of the rst period, a consumer has three options: stop their relationship
with the website, return to the website and opt in (i.e. not prevent the website from selling
her personal information), or return to the website and opt out.
A consumers decision to opt out depends on her beliefs about match value. Let
r  UG + UB
(h   l)UB
denote the solution to M(r) = 0. Our leading case in this section is the one in which
consumers opt out only after a bad experience, i.e. r1  r > rB or, equivalently, M(r1) 
36Bloch and Demange (2018) also analyze the e¤ect of opt-out on a websites privacy policy (captured by
it level of data exploitation), but assume that the websites policy is observable to consumers.
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0 > M(rB):
37
Since opting out leads to a match vale of M(r) = 0 instead of M(rB) < 0, the expected
retention of consumers with a bad experience rises from Q(rB) to Q(r). At the same time,
under single homing, the websites value of a retain consumer falls from a+v2 to a because the
website no longer earns second-period revenue from third parties for these consumers. The
same is true under multi-homing, except that the forgone expected revenue is less because
of competition in the market for information. The consequences for equilibrium precaution
and posterior beliefs are stated in the next two propositions, rst for single-homing in the
next proposition, and then for multi-homing.
Proposition 8 Assume M(r1)  0 > M(rB). In the single-homing scenario, consumers
ability to opt out leads to weakly lower equilibrium precaution (lower X) and weakly more fa-
vorable equilibrium posterior beliefs (higher rN) if Q(r)a  Q(rB) (a+ v2). Conversely, opt-
out leads to higher precaution and less favorable posterior beliefs if Q(r)a < Q(rB) (a+ v2).
Proposition 9 Assume M(r1)  0 > M(rB). In the multi-homing scenario, consumers
ability to opt out leads to weakly lower equilibrium precaution (lower X) and weakly more
favorable equilibrium posterior beliefs (higher rN) if QK(r)a  QK(rB)a+ Q^K (rB) v2: Con-
versely, opt-out leads to higher precaution and less favorable posterior beliefs if QK(r)a <
QK(rB)a+ Q^K (rB) v2.
We distinguish two alternative policy regimes. In a voluntary regime, under single-
homing, a website at its discretion can o¤er consumers the ability to opt out. Under
multi-homing, websites can collectively commit to o¤ering the ability to opt out consumers.
Notice that, in the multi-homing case, a consumer opts out of all websites or none. There is
in fact a strong externality governing websitesopt-out decisions. Indeed, the option o¤ered
by any given website is irrelevant if the consumer visits another website not o¤ering the
option. Rather than examine individual incentives of websites to o¤er the option, we focus
on a form of collective self-regulation, i.e. the policy permitting websites collectively to
commit to o¤er opt-out. In contrast, in a mandatory regime, websites have no choice but
to allow consumers to opt out.
Voluntary regime Assume that websites voluntarily allow consumers the ability to opt-
out if is weakly protable under single-homing and collectively protable under multi-
homing. Suppose websites can o¤er the option at any point in the game. Then websites o¤er
the option at the end of the rst period if Q(r)a  Q(rB) (a+ v2) in the single homing case,
37Other cases in the single-homing scenario are considered in Section 2 of the Online Appendix.
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and if QK(r)a  QK(rB)a+Q^K (rB) v2 in the multi-homing case. Furthermore, anticipating
this, websites might just as well commit to the policy at the beginning of the rst period,
assuming that u1 is su¢ ciently large that consumers do not opt-out initially.
If QK(r)a < QK(rB)a+ Q^K (rB) v2, however, websites might have a collective interest in
committing to opt-out at the beginning of the rst period. To see this, suppose [QK(rB) 
QK(r)]a   Q^K (rB) v2 = "  0. Starting at " = 0, a small increase in " has three e¤ects
on prots if consumers can opt-out. First, there is a direct negative e¤ect of lost third-
party revenue in the second period. Second, from Proposition 9, the resulting increase in
rst-period precaution has a negative e¤ect on second period prots due to less favorable
beliefs. Finally, greater precaution increases rst-period prots by reducing competition
in the market for information. In the single-homing case the e¤ect of a small change in
X on rst-period prots is second-order, because the single website is choosing precaution
optimally in equilibrium. This is not the case under multi-homing because each website
enjoys a rst-order benet from greater precaution exercised by its rivals in the market for
information.
Consequently, while there is a clear case for a voluntary opt-out policy under single
homing, the same cannot be said for permitting a voluntary collective agreement to o¤er
opt-out under multi-homing.
Proposition 10 Assume M(r1)  0 > M (rB). A voluntary opt-out policy under single
homing results in (weakly) less precaution and greater short- and long-run consumer utility
compared to no opt-out. In contrast, under multi-homing, a collectively voluntary opt-out
policy might similarly result in less precaution and greater consumer utility, but, under
certain conditions, might also result in more precaution, less short-consumer utility, and an
ambiguous e¤ect on long-term utility.
Mandatory regime A mandatory policy would enable consumers to opt-out even when
it is unprotable for websites. Thus, relative to a voluntary opt-out policy, a mandatory
policy a¤ects website conduct if and only ifQ(r)a < Q(rB) (a+ v2) under single homing, and
only if QK(r)a < QK(rB)a + Q^K (rB) v2 under multi-homing. Under these circumstances,
according to Propositions 8 and 9, opt-out results in greater precaution, and according to
Proposition 10, this is detrimental to consumers in the short run if M(r1) > 0, and has
mixed e¤ects on consumers in the long-run.
Proposition 11 Assume M(r1)  0 > M (rB) . Compared to a voluntary opt-out policy,
a mandatory opt-out policy results in more precaution, and lower prot and short-term
consumer utility, while the e¤ect on long-term consumer utility is ambiguous.
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The inevitable conclusion is that an unambiguous case for a mandatory opt-out policy
is lacking under both single-homing and multi-homing.
6 Extensions
In this section we present three extensions of our model. For the sake of simplicity, we focus
on the single-homing scenario (K = 1).
6.1 Verication of third party use of information
Assume that the (unique) website can verify third party use of information. For instance, a
website may use Articial Intelligence and human resources to screen out ads with o¤ensive
content, or may verify that requests to access customer information originate from known
legitimate third parties. To capture this, we suppose that, by incurring a cost Cv (Y ) ; the
website can generate a signal on the user experience that is informative with probability
Y; referred to as the level of verication. A non-informative signal conveys no information
while an informative signal allows to detect perfectly whether the third party will generate
a bad experience or not.38 Thus, an informative signal allows screening third parties gener-
ating bad experiences from those leading to good or neutral experiences.39 For conciseness,
we assume that Cv (Y ) is convex, C 0v (0) = 0 and C
0
v (1) = +1:
The websites strategy now consists of a choice of a level of verication Y as well as the
probability X that customer information is not sold in case verication fails. If verication
succeeds then the website denies access to information to third parties generating a bad
experience and grants other third parties full access to information. Therefore, we can
characterize the websites strategy by a pair
(X; Y ) 2 [0; 1]2:
Under a full precaution policy (X = 1), the consumer is immune to unwanted intrusions
from the sale of personal data, and verication is a way to raise the value to the consumer
38We chose this specication of the verication technology because it yields a nice separation property
between precaution and verication, thus making the analysis more transparent.
39As an illustration, suppose the website can incur a cost z, drawn from a distribution with an increasing
continuous cdf Z(:) over the support R+, to identify (with certainty) whether a match with a third party
will generate a bad experience or not. It is straightforward that there must exist a critical level z^ (potentially
zero) such that the website veries the third partys use of information if z < z^: We can then denote by
Y = Z (z^) the probability of verication and the cost of verication is Cv (Y ) =
R z^
0
zdZ (z) :
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of visiting the website. The variable Y then determines the benet from allowing access to
third parties that do not provide a bad experience. On the contrary, under a no precaution
policy (X = 0), verication is the only way to avoid interactions with third parties that
generate a bad experience and, therefore, determines the level of protection against them.
Let us now provide the probability of each type of rst-period experience and determine
how it depends on the level of precaution X and the level of verication Y . The probabili-
ties of a good experience (event G) and a bad experience (event B) are given, respectively,
by pG (X; Y ) =  [Y + (1  Y ) (1 X)] and pB (X; Y ) = 1 (1  Y ) (1 X) : Both proba-
bilities decrease with X because a higher level of precaution leads to less sales of personal
information to third parties. Moreover, the probability of a good experience is increasing in
the level of verication unless there is no precaution, because more verication decreases the
likelihood that a third party generating a good experience buys customer information. By
contrast, the probability of a bad experience decreases with the level of verication unless
there is full precaution. The probability of a neutral experience (event N) is then
pN (X; Y ) = 1  Y   (1  Y ) (+ 1) (1 X) : (6)
This probability increases withX as in the case with no verication. The e¤ect of the level of
verication Y on the probability of a neutral experience depends on the level of precaution
X, as shown by @pN=@Y = 1  (+ 1)X: The reason is that a higher level of verication
has two (potential) opposite e¤ects on the likelihood of a neutral experience. First, it a¤ects
it positively by increasing the probability that a third party generating a bad experience is
denied access to customer information. Second, it a¤ects it negatively by making it more
likely that a third party generating a good experience gets access to customer information.
The former e¤ect dominates the latter if the level of precaution is low (so that third parties
have an easy access to customer information).
The posterior beliefs after a good experience and a bad experience, rG and rB, are the
same as in the baseline model, while the posterior belief after a neutral experience is now
given by
rN = (X; Y )  1  Y   (1  Y ) (+ l) (1 X)
1  Y   (1  Y ) (+ 1) (1 X)r1: (7)
A neutral experience is again good news in the sense that rB < rG < rN for any X < 1.
The following lemma shows how the posterior belief after a neutral experience depends on
the levels of precaution and verication.
Lemma 6 i)  (X; Y ) is decreasing in X, ii)  (X; Y ) is decreasing in Y for any X < 1,
iii)  (0; 0) =  (0) and  (1; Y ) = r1 for all Y:
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Notice that the range of possible beliefs is the same with or without verication. By
reducing exposure to a third party generating a bad experience, verication makes the
experience less informative about vulnerability and reduces the posterior rN whenever X <
1: Under full precaution, no bad experience can occur and the posterior is not a¤ected by a
neutral or a good experience.
The analysis of the websites decision regarding the level of precaution is similar to the
one in the baseline scenario (with no verication). Indeed, as precaution refers to the proba-
bility of selling information when verication fails, the websites optimal level of precaution
does not depend on the level Y of verication. The equilibrium level of precaution when the
website anticipates a posterior rN is still Xbr (rN), as given by equation (2).
We decompose the total gain of not selling between the part related to bad experiences
and the rest. Toward this end, dene
G (rN)  V2 [Q (rG) Q (rN)] + (1  1) v1;
as the websites gain from selling information to the third party when it generates a neutral
or a good experience. Dene also
B (rN)  1V2 [Q (rN) Q (rB)]  1v1
as the gain from avoiding selling information when it induces a bad experience. Then
P (rN)  v1 = B (rN) G (rN) :
implying that when v1 2
 
 fV2;  
nV2

; the equilibrium level of precaution without veri-
cation rM veries B
 
rM

= G
 
rM

: Notice that, because G (r) decreases in r while
B (r) increases in r; verication is a single-peaked function of rN achieving a maximum at
posterior belief rM .
Consider now the verication decision. The trade-o¤faced by the website is di¤erent from
the one underlying the precaution decision because verication allows to sell customer infor-
mation only to third parties that generate a good or neutral experience (and would be used
only for this purpose since rB < rG). For a given level of precaution X, verication raises
the probability to sell customer information to a third party generating a good or neutral
experience from 1 X to 1 and, therefore, yields a benet XG (rN) from selling customer
information to such a third party more often. Verication also reduces the probability to
sell customer information to a third party that generates a bad experience from 1 X to 0,
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which leads to another expected benet given by (1 X)B (rN). The total benet from
verifying third partiesuse of information is then the sum XG (rN) + (1 X)B (rN).
When evaluated at X = Xbr (rN), the equilibrium condition (2) implies that this gain is
equal to min (B (rN) ;G (rN)). Thus, some verication occurs (i.e. Y > 0) whenever this
benet is positive, and the websites optimal verication level Y br (rN) is given by
C 0v
 
Y br (rN)

= max fmin (G (rN) ;B (rN)) ; 0g : (8)
Thus, an equilibrium is characterized by X; Y  and rN that solve equations (2), (7)
and (8). From equation (2), we can distinguish three scenarios:
- Full precaution occurs when rN = r1 and the level of verication is C
0
v (Y
) =
max fG (r1) ; 0g ;
- No precaution requires a low posterior belief rN < r
M and a level of verication given
by C 0v (Y
) = max fB (rN ) ; 0g :
- Partial precaution is only possible if the posterior belief after a neutral experience
satises r1 < rN = r
M <  (0), and the level of verication is given by C 0v (Y
) =
max

M ; 0
	
where M  G
 
rM

= B
 
rM

:
For v1 close to 0, the gainG (rN) can be made arbitrarily close to 0 or negative (because
rG = r1 =  (1)), while the gainB (rN) remains strictly positive. Thus, for su¢ ciently small
values of v1; the website chooses a full precaution policy and no verication, so that customer
information is never sold. Similarly, for su¢ ciently large values of v1, the website chooses no
precaution and no verication, so that customer information is sold to all interested third
parties. The following equilibrium characterization shows that the results of Proposition 1
pertaining the level of precaution extends to a setting with verication:
Proposition 12 A unique equilibrium exists.
(i) Equilibrium precaution is non-increasing in the value of information v1 and there exist
a threshold vn 2   fV2;  nV2 such that the website chooses full precaution if v1   fV2;
partial precaution if v1 2
 
 fV2; v
n

and no precaution if v1  vn;
ii) There exists a threshold v > vn such that the level of verication is positive if and
only if v1 < v: Equilibrium verication is increasing in v1 in the full- and partial-precaution
region and non-increasing in v1 in the no-precaution region.
Verication always occurs under the full precaution regime because the benet G (r1)
from selling information when it does not generate a bad experience is positive. It also occurs
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under the no precaution regime if the benet B ( (0)) from avoiding sales of information
leading to a bad experience is positive, which is the case when v1 is not too large. Finally,
in the partial precaution regime, the gain from verication M is always positive.
Let us now consider the way the websites equilibrium strategy depends on v1. As in the
case when there is no verication, the equilibrium level of precaution is non-increasing in v1.
When the value of information increases the equilibrium moves toward more frequent access
of third parties to customer information, leading to a higher posterior belief rN : Verication
allows to restrict sales to third parties generating good or neutral experiences, which induces
a short-term revenue loss that depends on the price v1 but also on the level of precaution.
Under the full precaution regime, raising v1 makes verication more attractive as it generates
more sales. In contrast, under the no precaution regime, raising v1 makes verication less
attractive as it reduces the probability to sell customer information. The proposition shows
that the partial precaution regime is similar to the full precaution regime in this respect.
Hence, we nd a non-monotonic e¤ect of the value of personal information v1 on the level
of verication.
The level of verication Y in our model can be viewed as a form of security investment
that reduces the risk of a bad experience from  to (1  Y ) . Introducing such a technology
a¤ects the learning process and thus the websites incentives to sell information to third
parties that are not proved to generate good or neutral experiences. Since the introduction
of the verication technology does not a¤ect the websites incentive to exert precautionX for
a given posterior belief rN but depresses the posterior belief for a given level of precaution,
it follows that the website exerts (weakly) less precaution when the probability of a bad
experience is lower.
The introduction of the verication technology may have one of the following e¤ects on
the level of precaution and the posterior belief rN .
i) First, if X = 1, they are not a¤ected (this is because  (1; Y ) = r1 is not a¤ected by
Y ).
ii) Second, if X = 0 and some verication occurs, the level of precaution remains equal
to zero and the posterior belief rN declines.
iii) Finally, if there is partial precaution in the absence of a verication technology, i.e.
0 < X < 1, there are two possible scenarios:
- In the rst scenario, the level of precaution declines but remains positive and the
posterior belief rN = rM is unchanged this happens when 
 
0; Y br
 
rM
  rM ;
- In the second scenario, the level of precaution falls from positive to X = 0 and the
posterior belief declines to rN = (0; Y
) < rM this happens when
 
0; Y br
 
rM

<
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rM .
Notice that in all cases the level of precaution is either una¤ected or lower than in the
baseline model without verication. In this sense, precaution and verication are substitutes.
Proposition 13 Verication reduces the equilibrium level of precaution. More generally, a
reduction in the marginal cost of verication raises Y  and reduces X.
Welfare and policy implications Consider the e¤ect of a uniform reduction in the
marginal cost of verication that either makes verication protable or makes it easier
when it is already protable. Such a reduction of the verication cost could result from
technological advances or policy measures. For instance, the law may impose an obligation of
transparency on data buyers or policy may promote public or private certication improving
information on potential data buyers. From the above analysis it follows that any technology
or policy change that would reduce the cost of verication would lead to less precaution,
more verication and (weakly) lower posterior belief rN .
Implementing a verication technology may raise or lower prot. Indeed, when rN is not
a¤ected, the website benets from having more instruments and a simple revealed preference
argument shows that prot increases. However, this may be countervailed by a reduction in
the posterior rN that reduces long-term prots. Notice that such reduction of rN can only
occur if the availability of the verication technology results in no precaution.
Let us now consider the consumer welfare implications of verication. We show in
the proof of the next proposition that verication reduces the equilibrium probability of a
bad experience and raises the probability of a good experience. However by denying access
to third-parties veried to generate a bad experience, it impedes the consumers learning
process. We thus reach the following conclusion.
Proposition 14 The introduction of the verication technology raises short-term consumer
utility and reduces long-term consumer utility.
Introducing verication technology into the baseline model strengthens our perspective
that simple regulations that reliably improve consumer welfare are elusive. Consider, for
example, a case in which X = 0 and Y  > 0; in equilibrium, the website verication
partially screens out bad actors, but otherwise exercises no precaution. In this case, ex
post transparency of the level of precaution would create an incentive for the website to
reduce verication (due to larger posterior rN). The consequence is to reduce short-term
consumer welfare because consumers are more exposed to bad experiences in the rst period,
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but to increase long-term utility because consumer learn about their vulnerability from a
neutral experience. Thus, in comparison to the baseline model, ex post transparency has
an ambiguous e¤ect on consumer welfare in the model with verication. Notice that an ex
ante transparency policy that doesnt constrain verication would again be inconsequential.
Similarly a mandatory opt-out policy reduces a websites incentive for verication, harming
consumers in the short-run, while improving long-term consumer welfare. Also, opt-out
and reduced verication could create incentives for precaution, further reducing short-term
consumer utility if M (r1) > 0, and with countervailing e¤ects on long-term utility.
6.2 Learning from good news
We have emphasized the case where consumers learn about the probability of a bad event
as we view it as particularly relevant. However, consumers may also be unsure about the
likelihood of a good experience and thus learn from good experiences. This is the case when
the parameter  is an unknown characteristic of the consumer. To address this, we now
assume that this parameter depends on the type of each consumer. A consumer of type l
is characterized by probabilities of good and bad experiences (l; l), while a consumer of
type h is characterized by (h; h). We denote by 1 and 1 the ex ante means of these
parameters. When both  and  are unknown, the consumer expected match utility is
M(r)  r (lUG + lUB) + (1  r) (hUG + hUB) :
As before, we suppose that type l has higher expected match utility, which amounts to
assuming that
(h   l)

UG
 UB

< h   l:
Under this assumption, M(r) is increasing and, therefore, the expected second-period rev-
enue of the website is increasing in the posterior belief rN that the type is l.
The equilibrium analysis follows the same lines as before except that i) the posterior
belief that the type is l after a good experience is rG = (l=1) r1, and (ii) the posterior
belief that the type is l after a neutral experience is
rN =  (X)  1  (l + l) (1 X)
1  (1 + 1) (1 X)r1: (9)
Notice that both rG and rN may be greater or smaller that the initial belief r1:
Consider rst the scenario in which l  h and l + l < h + h. In this case,  (X)
is decreasing and larger than rG and rB; as in the baseline model. Consequently, both the
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equilibrium analysis and the welfare and policy analysis carry over with no (qualitative)
changes.40
Suppose now that l > h and l + l < h + h: The function  (X) is still decreasing
but it is now smaller than rG: The equilibrium is still unique but the terms  
f and  n can
be negative, which expands the range of values v1 for which the website exerts no precaution
in equilibrium. In particular if  n < 0; there is no precaution for any value of information
v1:
Consider nally the scenario l + l > h + h, i.e. the scenario in which the con-
sumers beneting most from matching are those having a neutral experience the least often.
In this case, a neutral experience is bad news, i.e. rN < r1; and the function  (X) is
increasing. It is then straightforward to see that there will be three equilibria for an in-
termediate range of values v1 (and a unique one out of this range), still characterized by
X 2 argmaxX2[0;1]X (P ( (X))  v1) : In that range, both X = 0 and X = 1 are equi-
libria, and there is in addition an interior equilibrium with 0 < X < 1 (that is unstable).
The intuition is that in this case more (less) precaution anticipated by consumers makes
precaution more (less) attractive to the website.
6.3 Elastic demand
We now assume that rst-period demand is elastic and show how the equilibrium analysis
extends to this case.
In the baseline setting where the privacy policy is not observable, the mass of consumers
is endogenous and depends on the anticipated privacy policy. Suppose that in period 1,
consumers observe an (imperfect) signal of their utility. Thus, the expected utility u1 at the
beginning of period 1 depends on the received signal and is randomly distributed within the
population, according to some distribution F0. Consumers who decide to visit the website
in period 1 observe their utility u and then decide whether to visit the website in period 2.
A consumer anticipating precaution level Xa visits the website in period 1 if and only if
u1 + (1 Xa)M (r1) + CU2 (rN ; Xa; u1)  C maxf0; u1 +M (r1)g;
where U2 (rN ; Xa; u1)  E fmax (u+M (r) ; 0) j Xa; u1g : Let U (Xa) be the set of values of
u1 for which consumers visit the website in period 1.
The equilibrium analysis is the same as in Section 3.1 except that the cumulative dis-
40The only di¤erence is that in the opt-out section, the threshold for opting out is now r 
hUG+hUB
(h l)UG+(h l)UB :
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tribution function F (u) has to be replaced with F (u1;Xa) = Pr (u  u1 j u1 2 U (Xa)) :
Indeed, as demand is exogenous from the perspective of the website, its policy aims at
maximizing the total (intertemporal) revenue per user, hence its prot for an average distri-
bution F (:;Xa). Let us dene the functions Q (r;Xa) and P (rN ;Xa) as in Section 3.1 by
replacing distribution F with distribution F (:;Xa), and assume that there are continuous
in Xa. An equilibrium exists and is characterized as follows:
 If (1 + )Q (r1; 1)   1Q (rB; 1)   Q (rG; 1)  v1=V2, then full precaution is an
equilibrium and rst-period demand is Pr (u1 2 U (1)) :
 If (1 + )Q ( (0) ; 0)   1Q (rB; 0)   Q (rG; 0)  v1=V2, then no precaution is an
equilibrium and rst-period demand is Pr (u1 2 U (0)) :
 If none of the two conditions above holds, a partial precaution equilibrium exists such
that P ( (X) ;X) = v1 and rst-period demand is Pr (u1 2 U (X)) :
Note that, in contrast to the baseline model with an inelastic rst-period demand, multiple
equilibria may exist because P ( (X) ;X) need not be decreasing in X:
In terms of policy implications, note rst that the conclusions regarding ex post trans-
parency in the baseline model still hold (adjusting for the change in demand). However, an
important di¤erence with the baseline model is that under ex ante transparency, the web-
site takes into account the e¤ect of its privacy policy on rst-period demand. Transparency
may induce a larger level of precaution in the case where ex ante expected match values are
negative enough, if the gain in terms of demand outweighs the costs of lower retention rate.
However, if the expected match values are positive, the website would like to boost demand
and retention by committing to lower precaution but cannot do so, implying again that ex
ante transparency has no e¤ect.
Consider now the impact of an opt-out policy. In the current setting, o¤ering the ability
to opt out to consumers has the additional e¤ect of boosting rst-period demand (for a
given precaution level), which makes this more attractive for the website. In particular, the
website will still o¤er voluntarily the ability to opt out if Q(r)a  Q(rB) (a+ v2). Given
that under the voluntary regime opt-out is o¤ered more often than in the baseline model,
it is not clear whether an elastic rst-period demand makes the mandatory regime more or
less desirable.
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7 Conclusion
Imperfect information creates incentives for a website to protect consumer privacy. Our
model demonstrates this in a novel way by assuming that consumers who visit a website
learn from experience about their vulnerability to intrusions due to the website sharing
personal information with third parties, and that consumers who become pessimistic about
their vulnerability are less likely to return to the website. In response, the website exercises
precaution in dealing with third parties and veries third party use of customer information,
in order to prot from better consumer retention.
Our analysis shows how a websites incentive for privacy protection improves with the
value of consumer retention relative to the revenue from sharing personal information, the
sensitivity of consumer retention to consumer beliefs about vulnerability, and the sensitivity
of consumer beliefs to experience. Greater privacy protection, however, is a mixed blessing
for consumers, who, on the one hand, are better protected from intrusions, but, on the other
hand, may be deprived of positive matches with third parties and are less informed about
their vulnerability to third-party intrusions. Consequently, it is di¢ cult for authorities to
regulate privacy protection in a way that reliably improves consumer welfare. For example,
policies that improve the transparency of privacy policies and give consumers more control
over their personal information have either mixed or neutral e¤ects on consumer welfare.
Perhaps the best case for policy is to enforce a credible voluntary opt-out regime that enables
websites to commit to allow consumers to choose their privacy regime.
There are many interesting directions for further research. One is to assume that con-
sumers have some ability to protect themselves by concealing their identities when returning
to a website, e.g. by endogenously removing cookies. Another is to allow websites to charge
a subscription fee for continued access, possibly enabling them to better control their own
incentives for privacy protection. Finally, studying alternative models of multi-homing by
consumers and competition between websites may yield richer insights.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Clearly, since P (rN)   v1 decreases in v1 from positive to
negative values, full precaution must be an equilibrium for su¢ ciently small values of v1=V2;
a necessary and su¢ cient condition is P ( (1))   v1  0 which yields the threshold  f .
Similarly, no precaution is an equilibrium if and only if v1=V2 is su¢ ciently large that
P ( (0)) v1  0 which yields  n. Thus, there is no pure strategy equilibrium if P ( (0)) 
v1 > 0 > P ( (1))   v1. In this range of v1=V2, there exists a unique belief that holds
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the website indi¤erent about precaution, and this belief pins down equilibrium precaution:
P
 
rM

= v1 and  (X) = rM . Monotonicity follows from rM increasing in v1=V2 and  (X)
decreasing.
Proof of Lemma 1. The function v (r)  Emax  maxJf1;::;KgPk uk +M (r) ; 0	 is con-
vex in r. Moreover, if rN =  (X), an increase in X induces a mean-preserving contraction
of the distribution of r; this follows from E fr j Xg = r1, pG (X) and pN(X) both decreasing,
and rN decreasing in X. Therefore, from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), E fv (r) j Xg is
decreasing in X. The result follows because UK ( (X) ; X) = E fv (r) j Xg.
Proof of Proposition 2. If all other websites quote p = 0; then the future payo¤ of a
website is independent of the price it sets, and is equal to LK (rN). Therefore, quoting p = 0
is a best reply.
Proof of Proposition 3. An equilibrium with full precaution (x = X = 1) induces
rN =  (1) and exists if and only if v1  PK ( (1)). Consider now a symmetric equilibrium
with 0 < x < 1 and thus X = xK , and rN =  (X). For any p  v1 on the support of the
equilibrium strategy we must have
p [x+ (1  x) (1 H (p))]K 1 = xK 1pmax
where pmax is the upper bound of the support. This leads to a cumulative distribution
function
H (p) =
1  x

pmax
p
 1
K 1
1  x on an interval [pinf ; pmax] with pmax  v1
Notice that there cannot be a mass point because it could be undercut protably. Moreover,
we must have pmax = v1 because otherwise setting p = v1 would strictly dominate setting
p = pmax: Thus, we have
H (p) =
1  x

v1
p
 1
K 1
1  x on the interval [x
K 1v1; v1]:
The equilibrium payo¤ is then
LK (rN) + xix
K 1PK (rN) + (1  xi)xK 1v1;
implying that an interior equilibrium veries v1 = PK ( (XK)). Given that PK ( (X)) is
decreasing in X, the solution to the equation v1 = PK ( (X)) exists in (0; 1) and is unique
39
when PK ( (1)) < v1 < PK ( (0)). This implies that the equilibrium exists and is uniquely
dened for this range of values of v1. Thus, we have
H (p) =
1  (XK)
1
K

v1
p
 1
K 1
1  (XK)
1
K
which gives pinf = (XK)
K 1
K v1:
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Let us consider the case of perfect correlation, i.e. ui = u for
all i; where u is distributed according to F:WhenM (r) is negative, the total retention rate
and the unique retention rate are given by:
QK (r) = 1  F

 M (r)
K

and Q^K (r) = 0:
If M (r) is positive, the consumer visits in the second period only one website (assumed
to be chosen randomly) whenever the expected utility from third-party matching is mildly
negative. More specically, this occurs when 0 > u >  M (r). So for positive M (r) we
have:
QK (r) = 1  F (0) + F (0)  F ( M (r))
K
and Q^K (r) =
F (0)  F ( M (r))
K
:
In both cases, Q0K (r) and Q^
0
K (r) are smaller thanQ
0 (r) : This holds because 1
K
F ( M (r) =K) <
F ( M (r)) if M (r) < 0 and 1
K
F ( M (r)) < F ( M (r)) if M (r) > 0. Consequently, the
expected future gain from not selling is less sensitive to posteriors r than in the single-homing
case, i.e. PK (rN) < P (r

N) ; implying that there is less precaution with multi-homing for
any a and v2.
(ii) Assume now that Pr (uj > 0jui) > 0 for j 6= i. Note that the unique retention rate
can be written as
Q^K (r) =
Z +1
 M(r)
Pr

max
j 6=i
uj < min
 
ui; 0
 jui f  ui dui
where f = F 0, which implies that
Q^0K (r) = Pr

max
j 6=i
uj < min ( M (r) ; 0) j  M (r)

Q0 (r)  Q0 (r) :
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We have Pr (maxj 6=i uj < min (ui; 0) jui) < 1 and, therefore, Q^0K (r) < Q0 (r) for all r: Since
rN  rG = r1 > rB; we conclude that if a=v2 is small, PK (rN) < P (rN).
Suppose M (r) > 0; then
QK (r) = 1  F (0) +
Z 0
 M(r)
Pr

max
j 6=i
uj < uijui

f
 
ui

dui
and
Q0K (r) =M
0 (r) Pr

max
j 6=i
uj <  M (r) jui =  M (r)

f ( M (r))  Q0 (r) :
Hence again, PK (rN) < P (r

N) :
However if M (r) < 0; then
QK (r) = Q (r) +
Z  M(r)
0
 
1 H   M (r)  uijui f  ui dui:
where H is the cdf of
P
j 6=imax (u
j; 0) : Therefore
Q0K (r) Q0 (r) =M 0 (r)
 Z  M(r)
0
h
  M (r)  uijui f  ui dui   (1 H (0j  M (r)) f ( M (r)))!
may be either positive of negative.
Computations for Example 2. We have
Q^2 (r) = Pr

u1 >  M (r) ; u2 < 0; u1 > u2	
which leads to
Q^2(r) = 
2
Z u
 M(r)
(min (0; u)  u) du
where we use the double inequality u > min (0; u1) > u: Then, denoting Q12 (r) the expected
joint retention rate of both rms, we have
Q12 (r) = Pr

u1 + u2 >  M (r) ; u2 > 0; u1 > 0	 = 2 Z u
0
(u max (0; u M (r))) du;
where we use u > 0) u > max (0; M (r)) > max (0; u M (r)) > 0 > u .
Summing up, we have
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if M (r)  0 : Q^2 (r) = 2
Z 0
 M(r)
(u  u) du  uu = 2

 1
2
M (r)2   uM (r)  uu

if M (r)  0 : Q^2 (r) = 2 ( uM (r)  uu)
and
if M (r)  0 : Q12 (r) = 2u2
if M (r)  0 : Q12 (r) = 2
 Z u
 M(r)
udu+
Z  M(r)
0
(u+ u+M (r)) du
!
= 2
 
u2   M (r)
2
2
!
Thus, irrespective of the sign of M (r), the total retention rate is
Q2 (r) = 
2

 1
2
M (r)2   uM (r)  uu+ u2

= 2

 1
2
M (r)2   uM (r)

+ u:
Let us assume now M (r1)  0 > M (0). For K = 2, the gain from precaution writes
P2 (rN)  Fa f [Q2 (rN) Q2 (rG)] + 1 [Q2 (rN) Q2 (rB)]g
+Fv2
n

h
Q^2 (rN)  Q^2 (rG)
i
+ 1
h
Q^2 (rN)  Q^2 (rB)
io
:
Using the above expressions for the unique and total retention rates, we get
P2 (rN)  Fa2
(

  1
2
M (rN)
2   uM (rN)
    1
2
M (r1)
2   uM (r1)

+1
  1
2
M (rN)
2   uM (rN)
    1
2
M (0)2   uM (0)
)
+Fv2
2
(

  1
2
M (rN)
2   uM (rN)  uu
    1
2
M (r1)
2   uM (r1)  uu

+1
  1
2
M (rN)
2   uM (rN)  uu
  ( uM (0)  uu)
)
;
which can be rewritten as
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PK (rN)  F (a+ v2)2

 1
2
M (rN)  1
2
M (r1)  u

(M (rN) M (r1))
+Fa1
2

 1
2
M (rN)  1
2
M (0)  u

(M (rN) M (0))
+Fv2
21

 1
2
M (rN)
2   uM (rN) + uM (0)

;
Moreover, we have by interiority


 1
2
M (rN)  1
2
M (r1)  u

< 1;


 1
2
M (rN)  1
2
M (0)  u

< 1;


 1
2
M (rN)
2   uM (rN) + uM (0)

<  u (M (rN) M (0)) < M (rN) M (0) :
In the single-homing case, we have
P (rN) = 
F (a+ v2) (M (rN) M (r1)) + F (a+ v2)1 (M (rN) M (0)) :
Therefore,
PK (rN) < P (rN) :
Proof of Lemma 2. The websites expected payo¤ is L ((X))+XP ((X))+(1 X) v1.
The proof follows immediately from the fact that, under ex post transparency, the websites
net marginal gain from precaution is given by P ( (X))+0 (X) [L0( (X)) + P 0( (X)] v1.
Notice an equilibrium always exists because nding an equilibrium reduces to a simple
maximization problem in this case.
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider an equilibrium with 0 < x < 1; X = xK ; rN =  (X) : For
any p  v1; replicating the reasoning used to derive the partial precaution equilibrium in
Proposition 3, we must have a cumulative distribution function for prices given by
H (p) =
1 X 1K

v1
p
 1
K 1
1 X 1K on an interval [X
K 1
K v1; v1]:
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Now, consider an equilibrium with 0 < x  1 and suppose that a website deviates to xi
and p  v1: Then website is expected payo¤ is LK
 
(xix
K 1)

+ xix
K 1PK
 
(xix
K 1)

+
(1  xi)xK 1v1. Therefore, the websites net marginal gain from precaution at a symmetric
equilibrium with aggregate precaution X is given by
PK ( (X)) + [XP
0
K ( (X)) + L
0
K ( (X))]
0 (X)  v1;
which yields the result.
Notice that website is expected payo¤is quasi-concave in xi if LK ((X))+XPK ((X)) 
Xv1 is quasi-concave in X:41 In this case, there exists a unique non-trivial symmetric equi-
librium (i.e. an equilibrium di¤erent from the trivial one with zero precaution which always
exists) if and only if v1 > P ( (0)) + L0K (0)
0 (0) :
Furthermore, if LK ((X)) +XPK ((X)) Xv1 is convex in X then is an equilibrium
with X = 1 if and only if LK ((1))+PK ((1)) v1  LK ( (0)), and the only equilibrium
is X = 0 otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider rst the case K = 1: As rN =  (X) is decreasing
in X, the marginal gain of the website from increasing X is lower when it can commit
to its strategy: @(rN ;X)
@X
+ @(rN ;X)
@rN
0(X) < @(rN ;X)
@X
. This implies that a full precaution
equilibrium exists for a smaller range of values v1=V2 while a no precaution equilibrium
exists for a wider range. Consider now an equilibrium with no commitment featuring
an interior level of precaution X 2 (0; 1). Then for any X > X, ( (X) ; X) >
( (X) ; X) > ( (X) ; X) : Therefore, the website chooses X  X: Moreover, it holds
that @
@X
((X); X) + @
@rN
((X); X)0(X) = @
@rN
((X); X)0(X) < 0, which implies
that the website chooses X < X:
Consider now K  2 and a symmetric equilibrium with ~XK 2 (0; 1). We have
PK



~XK

 v1 =  

~XKP
0
K



~XK

+ L0K



~XK

0

~XK

> 0 = PK ((X

K)) v1;
which implies that ~XK is weakly lower than X

K :
Proof of Lemma 4. DenoteX2 the websites precaution level in period 2 and V2 (X2) = a+
(1 X2) v2 the expected revenue generated in period 2 by a returning consumer. Denoting
41To see why, notice that, for given precaution x by aother websites, maximizing website is individual
payo¤ amounts to maximizing LK
 
(xix
K 1)

+ xix
K 1PK
 
(xix
K 1)
  xixK 1v1with respect to xi 2
[0; xK 1]; which is the same as maximizing LK ((X))+XPK ((X)) Xv1 with respect to X 2 [0; xK 1]:
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rst-period precaution X1 (instead of X as in the rest of the paper), we have
@
@X2
=  E fF 0 (  (1 X2)M(r))M(r) j X1gV2 (X2)+E f1  F (  (1 X2)M(r)) j X1gV 02 (X2) :
The second term is negative. The rst term is non-positive ifM(rB)  0. Therefore, @=@X2
is negative and consequentlyX2 = 0 is optimalifM(rB) is not too negative. Alternatively,
if the probability of a bad event pB (X1) is small enough, which is the case if 1 is small
enough, then the rst term is non-positive and, again, @=@X2 is negative. Finally, since
E fr j X1g = r1, another su¢ cient condition for the rst term to be non-positive is that
E f F 0 (  (1 X2)M(r))M(r) j X1g   F 0 (  (1 X2)M(r1))M(r1)  0
which holds if  F 0 (  (1 X2)M(r))M(r) is a concave function of r, or equivalently (re-
calling that M(r) is linear), that uF 0 (u) is concave over the relevant range.
Proof of Proposition 6. Follows from the analysis above the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 5. The rst step is to derive the two rmssecond-period equilibrium
prots when one rm, say rm 1, chooses x1  0 in the second period while the other one
exerts no precaution in that period (for the sake of notational convenience, we use xi to
denote rm is second period precaution level in this proof).
Denote by Q^i the expected unique retention rate of rm i 2 f1; 2g and by Q12 the
expected joint retention rate of both rms (the expectation is over beliefs of the mass of
consumers joining both websites). Also denote Qi = Q^i + Q12: Notice that these retention
rates depend on x1. Notice also that if rm i serves a consumer, it does not know whether
it is unique or not. The conditional probability of a unique retention is Q^i=Qi:
Assume rm 2 sets x2 = 0 while rm 1 sets x1  0 in the second period. In any
equilibrium, with the same argument as before, the support of prices is the same for both
rms, [p; v2], but one rm has a mass point at v2:We proceed by considering two types of
equilibria depending on which rm has a mass point.
Assume that rm 2 sets a mass point 2 at v2: Denote i the ex ante prot rm i makes
from selling information in the second period. This prot can be written as i = iQi where
i is the prot from selling information on a retained consumer. Then, for any p in [p; v2),
prots from selling information are
1 = (1  x1) p

Q^1 +Q12 (1  F2 (p))

= (1  x1) v2

Q^1 +Q122

;
2 = p

Q^2 +Q12x1 +Q
12 (1  x1) (1  F1 (p))

= v2

Q^2 +Q12x1

;
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where the last term in each equation is prot at v2( "). Thus, indi¤erence on the support
yields
1
Q12
0@v2

Q^1 +Q122

p
  Q^1
1A = 1  F2 (p) ;
Q^2 +Q12x1
Q12 (1  x1)

v2
p
  1

= 1  F1 (p) :
The lower bound and the mass point are given respectively by :
p = v2
Q^2 +Q12x1
Q2
; 2 =

Q1x1   Q^1 + Q^2

Q2
:
This is an equilibrium if 2 > 0 which is equivalent to x1 >
Q^1 Q^2
Q1
:
Finally, the prot of rm 1 from selling information is in this case
1 = (1  x1) v2
 
Q^2 +Q12x1
Q2
!
Q1:
The same reasoning shows that there is a mass point 1 at v2 for rm 1 if x1 <
Q^1 Q^2
Q1
,
and in this case the equilibrium is given by
1
Q12
 
v2Q^
1
p
  Q^1
!
= 1  F2 (p)
1
Q12 (1  x1)
0@v2

Q^2 +Q12x1 +Q
121

p
 

Q^2 +Q12x1
1A = 1  F1 (p2) :
The lower bound and the mass point are now:
p = v2
Q^1
Q1
= v2

Q^2 +Q12x1 +Q
121

Q2
; 1 =
Q^1   Q^2
Q1
  x1:
The prot from selling information is then 1 = (1  x1) v2Q^1: Notice that the prot is
continuous in x1 and in retention rates Q^1; Q^2 and Q12:
We now compare retention rates. In the second period a consumer with beliefs r com-
pares u1 + (1  x1)M (r) ; u2 +M (r) ; u1 + u2 +M (r) and the zero utility from no con-
sumption. Dene
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Q^1 (r) = Pr

u1 > (x1   1)M (r) ; u2 <  x1M (r) ; u1   u2 > x1M (r)
	
;
Q12 (r) = Pr

u1 + u2 >  M (r) ; u2 >  x1M (r) ; u1 > 0
	
;
Q^2 (r) = Pr

u2 >  M (r) ; u1 < 0; u2 > u1   x1M (r)
	
:
Then, for i = 1; 2 : Q^i = E

Q^i (r)

and Qi = E

Q^i (r)

+ E (Q12 (r)) : Notice that Q^2 (r)
can be rewritten by symmetry (reverting u1 and u2) :
Q^2 (r) = Pr

u1 +M (r) > 0; u2 < 0; u2 < u1 + x1M (r)
	
;
where all events are more likely than the corresponding events in Q^1 (r) if M (r) > 0: Thus,
Q^2 (r) > Q^1 (r) for all r such thatM (r) > 0; which implies that whenM (r1)  0; Q^2 > Q^1 if
M (rB) is not too negative or the probability of a bad event is small enough. A su¢ cient
condition for the latter is that 1 is small enough.
We conclude that if M (rB) is not too negative or 1 is small enough then
T1 =
 
a+ (1  x1) v2
 
Q^2 +Q12x1
Q2
!!
Q1;
where all functions are continuous.
By the same reasoning,
Q1 = E
 
Pr

u1 +max
 
u2; x1M (r)

>  M (r) ; u1 > min  u2 + x1M (r) ; 0	
is strictly decreasing if M (rB) is not too negative or 1 is small enough. As a consequence,
T1 is decreasing in x1 if v2=a is small enough, which implies that x1 = 0 is optimal for rm
1; in other words, both rms exerting no precaution in the second period is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7. See Section 1 of the Online Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 8. Assume that Q(r)a  Q(rB) (a+ v2). Under the assumption
M(r1)  0 > M(rB), the return to precaution for a given belief rN under opt out (i.e. the
counterpart to P (rN) in the baseline model) is given by
P opt(rN) = 
F f1 [(a+ v2)Q (rN)  aQ(r)] + (a+ v2) [Q (rN) Q (rG)]g :
Assume that Q(r)a  Q(rB) (a+ v2). In this scenario, P opt(rN)  P (rN). Recalling that
P (rN) is increasing in rN , we distinguish between three cases:
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- When X = 0 in the baseline model we have P ( (0))  v1. This implies that
P opt( (0))  v1, which implies that equilibrium precaution remains equal to 0.
- When 0 < X < 1 then P (rN) = v1. Since P
opt(rN)  P (rN), the equilibrium posterior
belief after a neutral experience under opt-out will be weakly greater than its counterpart in
the absence of opt-out.: Since  is decreasing in X this implies that equilibrium precaution
is weakly lower under opt-out.
- When X = 1 then P (rN)  v1. In this case, P opt(rN)  P (rN) implies again that the
equilibrium posterior belief after a neutral experience under opt-out will be weakly greater
than its counterpart in the absence of opt-out, which entails that equilibrium precaution is
weakly lower under opt-out.
Proof of Proposition 9. Straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 8 to the
multi-homing scenario.
Proof of Proposition 10. Follows from the analysis above the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 11. Follows from the analysis above the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 6. Straightforward computations show that @=@X has the same
sign as (l   1) (1  Y ) (1  Y ), which proves (i), and that @=@Y has the same sign
as (1 X) (1   l) ( 1 + ), which proves (ii). The proof of (iii) is immediate.
Proof of Proposition 12. Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. An equilibrium
veries rN = 
 
Xbr (rN ) ; Y
br (rN )

. Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for a unique equilib-
rium to exist is that the correspondence 
 
Xbr (rN) ; Y
br (rN)

has a unique xed point.
We have:
- For rN < rM ; Xbr (rN) = 0 and C 0v(Y
br (rN)) = max fB (rN) ; 0g is non-decreasing,
implying that 
 
Xbr (rN) ; Y
br (rN)

is non-increasing in rN .
- For rN = rM ; Xbr (rN) 2 [0; 1] and C 0v(Y br (rN)) = max

M ; 0
	
:
- For rN > rM ; Xbr (rN) = 1 and C 0v(Y
br (rN)) = max fG (rN) ; 0g is non-increasing,
implying that 
 
Xbr (rN) ; Y
br (rN)

is constant in rN (recall that  (1; Y ) = r1 for any Y ).
Hence, 
 
Xbr (rN) ; Y
br (rN)

is a non-increasing continuous correspondence from [0; 1]
into itself. This implies that it has a unique xed point rN = 
 
Xbr (rN ) ; Y
br (rN )

:
Moreover, the graph of the correspondence is continuous in v1; which implies that rN is
continuous in v1.
Proof of (i). Let us rst show that rN is non-decreasing in v1 and X
 is non-increasing
in v1:
Suppose that X = 0 and let v1 increase. Then X remains constant and rN cannot
decrease. To see why the latter part holds, assume that rN decreases locally. Combined
with C 0v (Y
) = maxfB (rN ) ; 0g, this would imply that Y  is non-decreasing locally,
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while combined with rN = (0; Y
) and  (0; Y ) decreasing with Y , it would imply that
rN is increasing locally - a contradiction. It follows that Y
 is non-increasing in the no-
precaution region.
Suppose now that X = 1 and let v1 increase. Then X remains constant and so does
rN = (1; Y
) = r1:
Suppose nally that 0 < X < 1: We known from Proposition 1 that the result holds if
Y  = 0. Assume now that C 0v (Y
) = M > 0, and let v1 increase. We have rN = r
M and
drM
dv1
=
1
(+ 1)Q0 (rM)V2
> 0:
Moreover, as rM = (X; Y ), we have
drM
dv1
  @
@Y
dY 
dv1
=
@
@X
dX
dv1
implying that X decreases with v1 if
drM
dv1
>
@
@Y
dY 
dv1
: (10)
Di¤erentiating C 0v (Y
) = B
 
rM

= 1V2

Q
 
rM
 Q (rB)  1v1 with respect to v1, we
get
C 00v (Y
)
dY 
dv1
= 1

Q0 (rM)
drM
dv1
V2   1

= 1

Q0 (rM)V2
(+ 1)Q0 (rM)V2
  1

> 0;
This, combined with @=@Y < 0 for X < 1, implies that condition 10 holds.
We can therefore conclude that X is non-increasing in v1. This, combined with the
fact that X = 1 if v1 is su¢ ciently small and X = 0 if v1 is su¢ ciently large implies
that there exist thresholds vf and vn such that X = 1 if and only if v1  vf and X = 0
if and only if v1  vn. From  (1; Y ) = r1 for all Y  0, it follows that X = 1 if and only
if G (r1)  B (r1), which implies that the threshold vf is the same as the corresponding
threshold in the baseline model, i.e. vf =  fV2. Moreover, from  (0; Y )   (0) and the
fact that G (rN)   B (rN) is decreasing in rN it follows that G ( (0)) > B ( (0))
whenever G ( (0; Y )) > B ( (0; Y )), which implies that vn is less than or equal to the
corresponding threshold in the baseline model, i.e. vn   nV2. The subsequent proof of part
(ii) shows that Y  > 0 when v1 = vn, which implies that the strict inequality vn <  
nV2
holds.
49
Proof of (ii). Consider rst the case where X = 1. Then rN = r1, which implies that
G (r1) = (1  1) v1 > 0: It then follows from C 0v (Y ) = G (r1) that Y  > 0 and Y  is
increasing in v1.
Suppose now that X 2 (0; 1). From G
 
rM

= B
 
rM

it follows that
v1 =

(1 + )Q
 
rM
  1Q (rB)  Q (rG)V2:
Using this and M = B
 
rM

we get
M = 1

(1  1   )Q
 
rM

+ Q (rG)  (1  1)Q (rB)

V2,
which implies that M > 0 because Q
 
rM

> Q (rG) > Q (rB). Therefore, Y  =
(C 0v)
 1  M > 0.
Let us now turn to the case where X = 0. Then Y  = 0 if and only if B ( (0))  0
which writes as
v1  v  (Q ( (0)) Q (rB))V2:
From Q ( (0))   Q (rB) > (1 + )Q ( (0))   1Q (rB)   Q (rG) =  n, it follows that
v >  nV2 and consequently v > vn.
Finally, consider the way Y  is a¤ected by v1. In the full precaution regime, C 0v (Y
) =
G (r1) is increasing in v1, which implies that Y  is increasing in v1. In the no precaution
regime, Y  is non-increasing in v1 because rN = (0; Y
) is non-decreasing in v1 and  is
decreasing in Y . Finally, in the partial precaution region, we have
C 0v (Y
) = Q (rG)  Q(rM) + (1  1) v1 = 1Q(rM)  1Q(rB)  1v1;
which yields
Q(rM) =
v1 + Q (rG) + 1Q(rB)
+ 1
and, therefore,
C 0v (Y
) = 1

v1 + Q (rG) + 1Q(rB)
+ 1
 Q (rB)  v1

:
Hence, Y  is increasing in v1 in the partial precaution region.
Proof of Proposition 13. The proof for the fact that verication reduces the equilibrium
level of precaution is immediate in all cases except when 0 < X < 1 and rN = r
M : How-
ever, in that case, straightforward computations show that 1 X =  1 Y 
1 Y 

(1 X) >
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1 X.
If C 0v (Y ) decreases uniformly, then Y
br (rN) (weakly) increases uniformly and
 
X; Y br (rN)

(weakly) decreases. Suppose rst that Y  > 0 and X = 0: Then a marginal reduction in
C 0v leads to a decrease in r

N = 
 
0; Y br (rN )

and an increase in Y . Suppose now that
Y  > 0 and X > 0. In this case, a marginal reduction in C 0v leaves r

N = r
M unchanged
and raises Y  = Y br
 
rM

. As  (X; Y ) = rM , the level of precaution X must de-
crease.
Proof of Proposition 14. From equation (7) we have
1 X = 1  Y

1  Y 
rN   r1
(+ 1) rN   (+ l) r1 :
The resulting probabilities of events G, B and N are then given, respectively, by
pG =
 (rN   r1)
(+ 1) rN   (+ l) r1 +
 (1rN   lr1)
(+ 1) rN   (+ l) r1Y
,
pB =
1 (rN   r1)
(+ 1) rN   (+ l) r1 (1  Y
) ;
pN =

1  (+ 1) rN   r1
(+ 1) rN   (+ l) r1

(1  Y ) :
Suppose rst that the posterior belief rN is not a¤ected by the possibility to verify and
screen out bad experiences. Then the availability of a verication technology leads to an
increase in the likelihood of a good experience and a decrease in the likelihood of a neutral
or bad experience. It follows that the short-term consumer utility increases.
The distribution of the posterior beliefs r undergoes a mean-preserving contraction.
Hence, the long-term consumer utility declines reecting a decrease in the informativeness
of the signal after a neutral experience.
Consider now the scenario in which the posterior belief rN declines as a result of the
availability of a verication technology. This occurs only when the resulting level of pre-
caution is zero, thus leading to the following probabilities of experiences: pG (0; Y ) = ;
pB (0; Y
) = (1  Y ) 1, and pN (0; Y ) = 1      (1  Y ) 1: As the probability of a
bad experience is reduced and the probability of a good experience is either increased or
unchanged, the e¤ect of verication on short-term consumer utility is positive.
The change in the distribution of posterior beliefs satises a single-crossing property so
that verication induces a reduction in risk in the sense of second-order stochastic domi-
nance. This implies that the e¤ect on long-term consumer utility is again negative.
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Appendix for Online Publication
1 Ex ante transparency in the multi-homing scenario
Consider the case of ex ante transparency where websites may refuse to sell. In this scenario,
all websites observe all levels of precaution before setting prices. Refusal to sell is possible so
that the strategy is a public choice of xi, followed by a private choice of a probability to refuse
to sell yi and a price pi: The total probability of not selling is then zi = xi + (1  xi) yi: We
focus on symmetric equilibria xi = x.
Suppose rst that PK
 

 
xK

> v1. In this case the payo¤of a website choosing xi 6= x
is
LK (rN) + ziz
K 1PK (rN) + (1  zi) p (z + (1  z) (1 H (p)))K 1 with zi 2 (xi; 1) :
Assume that the market anticipates zK = XK > x
K : Then it follows from above that the
equilibrium obtains at z = x+ (1  x) y = (XK)
1
K : Hence, when X < XK ; the equilibrium
probability of sale and the distribution of prices is the same as without transparency.
Suppose now that PK
 

 
xK

< v1: Then the symmetric equilibrium distribution of
prices is as above. Suppose a website deviates to xi 6= x while preserving PK (rN) < v1:
Then all websites set p  v1: It can be seen that the lower bound of the support of the price
must be the same for all rms (this is because K  1 rms set higher prices than K rms so
that there would a contradiction if a smaller number of rms were to charge lower prices).
However, one website may have a mass point at v1 or may not charge high prices.
We consider rst the scenario in which the deviating website i puts a mass at v1.
Then, on the support of prices the following indi¤erence condition must hold for web-
site i: p (x+ (1  x) (1 H (p)))K 1 = xK 1v1, and the following condition must hold for
the other websites (where we use the fact that other websites can set a price below but
arbitrarily close to v1):
p (x+ (1  x) (1 H (p)))K 2 (xi + (1  xi) (1 Hi (p))) = (xi + (1  xi) (1 Hi (v1)))xK 2v1:
This yields
H (p) =
1  x

v1
p
 1
K 1
1  x on an interval [x
K 1v1; v1]
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and
(xi + (1  xi) (1 Hi (p))) = (xi + (1  xi) (1 Hi (v1)))

v1
p
 1
K 1
:
This equilibrium holds provided that the supports are the same, that is, when x = xi +
(1  xi) (1 Hi (v1)), which holds for xi < x: The payo¤ of the deviating website with
xi < x is then
LK
 

 
xix
K 1+ xixK 1PK    xixK 1+ (1  xi)xK 1v1:
Suppose now that xi > x: If K = 2 we can apply the previous analysis reverting
the role of i and the other website. As the latter sets a mass point at v1 such that x +
(1  x) (1 H (v1)) = xi; the payo¤ of website i is then given by
LK ( (xix)) + xixPK ( (xix)) + (1  xi)xiv1:
Assume now that K > 2: In this case we investigate an equilibrium where the deviating
website does not charge high prices but only prices between pmin and p^ < v1. The following
conditions must hold. First, on the interval (pmin; p^) we must have
p (x+ (1  x) (1 H (p)))K 1 = p^ (x+ (1  x) (1 H (p^)))K 1 ;
and
p (x+ (1  x) (1 H (p)))K 2 (xi + (1  xi) (1 Hi (p))) = xixK 2v1:
Second, on the interval (p^; v1) we must have
p (x+ (1  x) (1 H (p)))K 2 xi = xixK 2v1:
Thus, we get:
H (p) =
1  x

v1
p
 1
K 2
1  x on [p^; v1]
Then, we must have x + (1  x) (1 H (p)) = (p^=p) 1K 1 (v1=p^)
1
K 2 xK 1 on [pmin; p^], and
xi+(1  xi) (1 Hi (p)) = (p^=p)
1
K 1 xix
K 2 on [pmin; p^]. For the support to be the same we
need that (v1=p^)
1
K 2 = xi=x > 1 or xi > x, which is the case. To complete the equilibrium
we verify that the deviating website setting p > p^ would obtain
LK
 

 
xix
K 1+ xixK 1PK    xixK 1+ (1  xi) pxK 1v1
p
K 1
K 2
;
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which decreases with p and thus is lower than the payo¤ at p^:
LK
 

 
xix
K 1+ xixK 1PK    xixK 1+ (1  xi) p^xK 1i :
To summarize we nd that the deviation payo¤ is given by:
LK ( (X

K)) +X

KPK ( (X

K)) +

1  (XK)
1
K

(XK)
K 1
K v1 if xi < x and xK  XK ,
LK
 

 
xix
K 1+ xixK 1PK    xixK 1+ (1  xi)xK 1v1 if xi < x and xK > XK ,
LK
 

 
xix
K 1+ xixK 1PK    xixK 1+ (1  xi) v1xK 2xi if xi > x and xK > XK :
The left derivative is negative at xK > XK and is strictly smaller than the right derivative
at that point. The reason for this kink in the payo¤ is that committing to xi > x induces a
strategic e¤ect that leads the other websites to raise their prices. Hence, the only candidate
for a pure precaution equilibrium is at xK = XK and it exists only if
(XKP
0
K ( (X

K)) + L
0
K ( (X

K))) (X

K)
1
K 0 (XK) +

1  (XK)
1
K

v1  0:
and, therefore, only if XK is large enough. Given that X

K decreasing in v1; this holds if
v1 is small enough.
2 Equilibrium analysis under opt out
We focus here on the single-homing case (K = 1). Our equilibrium analysis in the scenario
in which customers are granted an opt-out option focused on the case where consumers
never opt out in the rst. period and opt out in the second period if and only if they have a
bad experience in the rst period. In this section, we still focus on the case when consumers
never opt out in the rst period but allow for all possible scenarios in the second period.
As a preliminary remark, note that when r < rB, the equilibrium is not a¤ected by the
possibility of opting out as consumers never choose this option. Similarly, in the case where
r >  (0) ; consumers always opt out in the second period. Therefore, the website always
sells customer information to third parties in the rst period, i.e. X = 0: We focus in what
follows on the scenario in which rB < r   (0) :
Under this assumption, it cannot be the case that all consumers opt out after a neutral
experience because this would imply that X = 0 and rN =  (0) < r: Thus, in equilibrium,
consumers should opt in with a positive probability, denoted P;; after a neutral experience.
As we shall see, this probability may be less than 1. We need to distinguish between two
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types of equilibria depending on whether consumers opt out or not after a good outcome
is observed. In the main text, we considered the scenario in which consumers opt out after
a bad experience but not after a good one (i.e. rB < r < r1). We now investigate the
existence of an equilibrium in which consumers opt out after a good experience as well. This
is the case when r1 < r <  (0) :
Note rst that an equilibrium requires that rN  r because some consumers must opt
in. This condition is trivially veried if r   (1), in which case we can replicate the proof
of Proposition 1. Dening
vf = (+ 1)

Q ( (1))V2   Q V2

vn = (+ 1)

Q ( (1))V2   Q V2

;
we get the following result.
Proposition 15 Consider the single-homing scenario (K = 1) and assume r1 < r   (1).
Then, a unique equilibrium exists. Moreover, there exist thresholds vf and vn such that:
(i) the website provides full precaution (Xopt = 1)if v1  vf ;
(ii) the website provides partial precaution (0 < Xopt < 1) if vf < v1 < vn;
(iii) the website provides no precaution (Xopt = 0) if v1  vn.
Proof. Since r;   (1)  r; it is su¢ cient to replace Q (rG)V2 and Q (rB)V2 by Q V2 in
the proof of Proposition 1 to get this result.
The website would not o¤er the opt-out option on a voluntary basis if [Q(rG) +
1Q (rB)]V2 > ( + 1) Q V2: In this case, notice that vf and vn are greater than  
fV2 and
 nV2; respectively, and that Xopt > X in the range of partial precaution. Thus, the e¤ect
of a mandatory opt-out policy is to raise (weakly) the level of precaution.
Let us now turn to the scenario in which  (1) < r <  (0). The analysis in the case
r1 < r <  (0) no longer applies because the level of precaution cannot be too large in
equilibrium. Let us dene X as the unique solution to 
 
X

= r: Then, in any equilibrium
we must have Xopt  X. Notice that the equilibrium level of precaution Xopt decreases in
v1: Since for su¢ ciently large values of v1 we have Xopt = 0; there must exist some critical
level vo such that Xopt < X if and only if v1 > vo. In this range, the equilibrium is similar
to the one when r1 < r   (1). However, for lower values of v1, the equilibrium must be
such that Xopt = X and consumers randomize between opting in and opting out.
Proposition 16 Consider the single-homing scenario (K = 1) and assume  (1) < r <
 (0). Then, a unique equilibrium exists. Moreover, there exists a threshold vo such that:
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(i) the website provides partial precaution and Xopt = X if v1  vo;
(ii) the website provides partial precaution and Xopt 2  0; X if vo < v1 < vn;
(iii) the website provides no precaution (Xopt = 0) if v1  vn.
Proof. The result is the same as before when v1 > vo where vo is dened by
vo = (+ 1)

Q
 

 
X

V2   Q V2

For smaller values of v1, we have X = X and rN = r in equilibrium, and
P; =
v1
vo
< 1:
It then su¢ ces to replace Q (rG)V2 and Q (rB)V2 by Q V2 in the proof of Proposition 1.
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